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284 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. The authorities do not fully discuss how far the rights of a creditor to avoid a prior fraudulent deed are affected by notice, at the time of contracting his claim, of the earlier conveyance. It seems, however, that actual notice will prevent him from attacking even a deed fraudulent in fact. Monroe v. Smith, 79 Pa. St. 459. The prin- cipal case reaches a different result when the notice is merely constructive, although the fraud is also only an inference of law. Property — Covenant in Lease — Dumpor's Case. — The plaintiff leased land for a term of years, the lessee covenanting not to assign without the written consent of the lessor. One assignment was made with the plaintiff's authority. The assignee in turn assigned the term, but without consulting the plaintiff. Held, that the last assign- ment was valid ; for after the first authorized assignment the covenant was destroyed. J^eid V. Weissner dr' Sons Brewing Co., 40 Atl". Rep. 877 (Md.). See Notes. Property — Nuisance — Nominal Damages. — In an action for maintenance of a nuisance, held, that a verdict for nominal damages, in the absence of proof of special damage, is proper. Farley v. Gate City Gas Co., 31 S. E. 193 (Ga.). The case follows the rule, generally accepted in this country, that an action on the case may be maintained to prevent the acquirement of a prescriptive right, although no actual damage has resulted from the alleged nuisance. Bolivar Mfg. Co. v. Nef on- set Mfg. Co., 16 Pick. 247. In England it is held that an action is maintainable only when actual damage has been suffered, until which time, in consequence, a prescriptive right does not begin to run. Sturges . Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852. The American doctrine is more satisfactory, as under the English law an adjoining landowner may, after a lapse of twenty years, require the destruction of permanent works which he must have known at the time of their erection would annoy him in the future use of his property. Quasi-Contracts — Wilful Breach of Contract. — The plaintiff contracted to put plumbing in the defendant's house. Having partly completed the work, he refused without good excuse to proceed. Held, that the plaintiff cannot recover on a quantum meruit iox work done. Cochran v. Balfe, 54 Pac. Rep. 399 (Colo., C. A.). The principal case follows the weight of authority. Turner v. Robinson, 5 B. & Ad. 789; Stark V. Parker, 19 Mass. 267 ; Larkin v. Buck, 11 Oh. St. 561. Many States, how- ever, allow the plaintiff this action. Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481 ; Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 107. The latter line of decisions establishes the better principle if its applica- tion is restricted to cases where the plaintiff is in default for the breach of a condition implied in law. The courts have failed to distinguish between such cases and cases where the condition is express. In the latter the plaintiff has wilfully deprived himself of his action on the contract, and there is no ground for allowing him to invoke the aid of the equitable principles of quasi-contract. But if the condition is one implied in law, the defendant can only escape performance of his contractual obligation on equitable grounds, and therefore should not be allowed to retain the benefit of the plaintiff's labor without making fair recompense. See 8 Harv. Law Rev. 364. Suretyship — Rights of Co-surety — Subrogation. — Held, that where one of two sureties on a note is obliged to pay the note, he is entitled to put in his claim against the insolvent estate of his deceased co-surety for the full amount of the note, and to receive dividends until reimbursed to the extent of one-half the debt. Pace v. Pace, 30 S. E. Rep. 361 (Va.). The decision is eminently sound. What few adjudications are to be found upon the precise question involved are to the same effect, with the exception of Institution v. Hathaway, 134 Mass. 69. A practical and it seems a conclusive objection to a contrary view is that it would make the amount of the burden which the insolvent surety must bear depend upon whether the holder of the original obligation or the co-surety pro- ceed against the surety's estate. That such a result is not necessary upon principle is clearly shown by Professor Ames in 5 Harv. Law Rev. 406. It is generally held that one partner cannot prove in bankruptcy against another for the full amount of a partner- ship obligation which he was compelled to discharge. Ex parte Smith, Buck, 492. But, upon principle, the doctrine of subrogation should be applied as in the cases between co-sureties. The decisions that a joint obligor on a bond may prove against a co-obligor in bankruptcy as a specialty debtor, illustrate still more strikingly the inconsistency of the courts. Litterdale v. Robinson, 12 Wheat. 594. See also Robertson v. Trigg, 32 Gratt. 76. Why the obligor is subrogated to the creditor's rights as regards the nature of the debt but not as regards the amount is not made apparent. Suretyship — Statute of Limitations. — In consideration of a promise bv the plaintiff bank to honor an overdraft by a third party, defendant guaranteed repayment, together with interest, to be compounded every six months. Held, that though action for the principal sum is barred by the Statute of Limitations, plaintiff can recover for