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RECENT CASES. 355 statement that what the prisoner said might be used against him does not invalidate a confession, as no threat is implied. Re^. v. Baliiry, 2 Den. C. C. 430. The principal case goes a step further; yet it is only by putting a very strained construction on the words that one can find any threat or promise implied in them. The words merely state that what the prisoner said would be i)ut in evidence, and the court seem very properly to have held that this did not invalidate the confession. Fkderal JuRiSDicrioN — Corporations. — A Kentucky statute provided that no foreign corporation should do business within the State without first complying with certain rules and becoming a corporation of Kentucky. Defendant was an Illinois corporation, and complied with the Kentucky statute. On being sued in Kentucky, by a citizen of that State, it obtained a removal to the federal court. On a motion to remand, held, that the defendant is, for the purposes of federal jurisdiction, a "citizen" of Illinois, and as such is entitled to have the action tried in the federal court. Taylor v. ///. Ce7tt. H. R. Co., 89 Fed. Rep. 119 (Cir. Ct., Ky.). See Notes. International Law — Breach of Blockade. — A steamship was brought to ten miles to the northeast of a blockaded port and formally warned away. Four hours afterward she was captured seventeen miles to the northwest of the port. Held, that tliis loitering before a blockaded port was a breach of the blockade. The Newfound' land, 89 Fed. Rep. 99, 510 (Dist. Ct, S. C). See Notes. Libel — Sufficiency of Publication. — A manager of a corporation, in con- nection with its business, dictated a libellous letter to a stenographer in the corpora- tion's employment, who copied and mailed the same to plaintiff. Held, that the dictation, copying, and mailing constituted but a single act of the corporation, and did not amount to a publication of the letter. Owen v. Ogilvie Pub. Co., 53 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (Sup. Ct, App. Div., Second Dept.). The reason given for the decision is that a corporation ordinarily requires the action of both the manager and the stenographer to produce a letter and therefore the whole transaction constituted but the act of writing, thus precluding any separate communi- cation to the stenographer. The argument is somewhat finely drawn, and it is difficult to appreciate any distinction because of the fact that the acting parties were the servants of a corporation rather than of a private individual. The court makes no mention of the case of Pullman v. Hill, [1891] i Q. B. 524, where the dictation of a letter by the manager of a firm to a stenographer was held to be a sufficient publication. See also Boxsius v. Freris, [1894] i Q. B. 842. Pullman v. Hill, supra, has been criti- cised on the ground that there could be no publication, since, when the letter was dic- tated there was no libel in existence. The mere uttering of words, although at the time it is intended that they should be written down, does not constitute libel but may constitute slander. Odgers, Libel and Slander, 174. If this criticism is sound, it affords a possible ground on which to support the principal case. Pleading — Statute of Limitations. — Defendant demurred to a declaration in assumpsit which showed that the cause of action arose more than six years previous. Held, that the declaration did not state a good cause of action. Crow v. Board of Com- missioners of Grant County, 54 Pac. Rep. 880 (N. Mex.). The phraseology of the Statute of Limitations merely indicates that a defence is given to the defendant in a certain event, and not that the plaintiff has no cause of action. As early as the time of Charles II. it was decided that to take advantage of the statute it must be specially pleaded. Puckle v. Moor, i Ventris, 191. Chitty says that it is no objection to the declaration that the day of the promise appears to have been more than six years before the commencement of the action. Chit. PI., i6th Am. ed., 273. Where the plaintiff relies on "a waiver of the statute, he declares on the original cause of action and interposes the waiver by way of replication to the defendant's plea that the statutory period has run. Ilsley v.Jewett, 3 Met. 439 (Mass.). If the defendant were allowed to demur to the declaration he could still prevent re- covery although he had waived his defence. The principal case is contrary to the weight of authority, and seems indefensible on principle, i Saund. 283, note (2) ; Chit., PI., i6th Am. ed. 506. Property — Accession — Relative Values. — Defendant, an innocent tres- passer, cut down the plaintiff's standing timber, and converted it into cross-ties. The value of the timber was thus increased six times. In an action of replevin, held, that the increase in value is not sufficient to entitle the defendant to the cross-ties. Eaton V. Langley, 47 S. W. Rep. 123 (Ark.). See Notes. Property — Animals Fer/« Nature. — A sea-lion escaped from the control of its possessor, and was abandoned by him. A year afterward it was recaptured by a fisherman seventy miles from the place of escape. Held, that the qualified right of property in the former possessor was lost bv the escape. Mullett v. Bradley, 53 N. Y. Supp, 781 (Sup. Ct., App. Term). See Noies. 46