Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/283

INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT ON FEDERAL AUTHORITY 247 Here the position seems to be that what the commerce clause in- hibits is the cumulation of taxes on interstate commerce. But the cumulation denounced does not include taxes on the franchise to be a corporation or to employ corporate powers in local business. Whether taxes on such privileges may be imposed in addition to taxes on property is left uncertain. But there is no uncertainty as to the elements that may be considered in assessing property: "It is enough for the State that it finds within its borders property which is of a certain value. What has caused that value is immaterial. It is protected by state laws, and the rule of all property taxation is the rule of value, and by that rule property engaged in interstate commerce is controlled the same as property engaged in commerce within the State." «  This, of course, is because the court chooses to have it so. The wisdom of their choice is not here disputed. But the effort to show that the choice does not result in burdening interstate commerce cannot receive the same approval. It is difficult to agree that the assessment of property by reference to the earnings of the business to which the property is devoted is not "an attempt to do by indirection what cannot be done directly — that is, to cast a burden on interstate commerce." ^ An accoimtant would hardly be satis- fied with the argument that "it comes rather within that large class of state action, like certain police restraints, which, while indirectly affecting, cannot be considered as a regulation of inter- state commerce, or a direct burden on its free exercise." ®® Even a rhetorician might find the argument a concession that the state may do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly. If we are interested primarily in what happens, and only secondarily in what words are used to justify or condemn it, we observe little, if any, difference between a tax on receipts and a tax on property assessed on a basis of receipts. When a court holds that taxes on property may be measured by receipts from interstate commerce or a capitali- zation thereof, it allows a state to regulate interstate commerce, no matter what name may be affixed to the state action. In any factual sense, this regulation is still a regulation even though it is •* 154 y. S. 439, 446-47, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1122 (1894). •» Ihid., 439, 447- •« Ibid.