Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/100

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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I. In Tennessee it is held that the pipes remain the personal property of the company.[1]

I. In Iowa it is held that they are affixed to the land on which the main works or sources of supply are situated, and are taxable as real estate of the company in the town where that land lies, though they may run into another town.[2]

III. In Rhode Island it is held that they are affixed to an easement which the company possesses in the soil of the street, and are therefore real estate of the company where they lie.[3]They are taxed, then, not as an easement of such value, but as actual tangible real estate owned by the company as appurtenant to its easement.

IV. In England it is held that they are affixed to the soil, and are, therefore, real estate; but that they are only occupied, not owned, by the company.[4] This view is apparently held in New York also.[5]

To consider the less tenable views first, it seems clear that the theory of the Iowa court cannot be sustained; though it is supported, it is said, by the practice of the assessors in at least one other Western State. It seems to have at least three fatal flaws. First, it is opposed to the facts. The water-mains in that case were no more affixed to the water-works than to the street-hydrants or to the land of consumers; as, for instance, a bridge is equally affixed to each bank of the river. Secondly, it is opposed to every other decided case in which the subject is considered. Thirdly, it is opposed to common sense.

The Rhode Island case is based on a phrase of Lord Campbell in his decision in the Chelsea water-works case, so far as it is

  1. Memphis Gas-Light Co. v. The State, 6 Coldw. 310.
  2. Appeal of The Des Moines Water Co., 48 Ia. 324.
  3. Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 2 R.I. 15.
  4. Compare King v. Brighton Gas-Light Co., 5 B. & C. 466, with Chelsea Water-works Co. v. Bowley, 17 Q. B. 358- In the former case the company was held to be an occupier of land in the parish through which its pipes ran, and, therefore, to be liable to the poor-rate. In the latter case the company was held to have no in interest (i. e., ownership) in the land through which the pipes ran, and, therefore, not to be, liable to the land tax. In the former case it was distinctly held that the pipes were not personal property, but were affixed to the soil; the contrary having been urged by the company's counsel. The effect of these two cases is, therefore, as stated in the text.
  5. People v. Assessors of Brooklyn, 39 N. Y. 81. The decision is, that the pipes were not affixed to any land of the company, and, therefore, not taxable to it as real estate belonging to it. The court seems to take it for granted that the pipes were real estate.