Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/203

RECENT CASES. .187 to another the mark of the Goldsmiths' Company, it was found that there was absolutely no intent on his part to defraud ; yet he was con- victed. In such cases, the intent, so far from being criminal, is good ; but the courts go upon grounds of public policy. The same principle is expressed in a case in the United States Supreme Court, ^ and has been discussed and followed in a number of cases in Massachusetts.^ II. In general, however, a wrongful, though not necessarily a criminal, intent is essential. This must be interpreted in a very conventional manner, as fixed by the constructions of the courts. But there are quahfi- cations of this principle, viz. : — (i.) It is not necessary that the intent should be to do the act specified. For example, where a woman, in attempting to commit suicide, shot the man who was interfering to save her, she was held guilty of manslaughter. ^ (2.) Where there is an intent to do a wrongful act, and the results are more serious than was contemplated, but are in the natural line of what was done, the wrong-doer is deemed to have intended the complete act which was done. For example, if A strikes B, and as a result of the blow B dies, A is guilty of manslaughter.* (3.) When one's accomplice in a proposed wrong goes further in the perpetration of it than was contemplated, one is deemed to have intended all that his accomplice actually does. For example, A and B go out with the purpose of robbing C ; A kills C by mistake ; then B is liable, though he took no part in the killing, and had not the remotest idea that A would accomplish it.^ RECENT CASES. [These cases are selected from the current English and American decisions not yet regularly reported, for the purpose of giving the latest and most progressive work of the courts. No pains are spared in selecting all the cases, comparatively few in number, which disclose the general progress and tendencies of the law. When such cases are particularly suggestive, comments and references are added, if practicable.] Agency— Fraud — Remedies of Principal. — The commissions which an agent corruptly receives in return for dealing with a particular firm, cannot be followed by the principal into the agent's investments. The relation between the defendant and the plaintiffs is that of debtor and creditor, not trustee and cestui que trust. Lister <Sr» Co. V. Stubbs, 45 Ch. Div. i (Eng.). Agency — Fraud — Remedies of Principal. — Where an agent, in return for a bribe, induces his principal to pay for an article more than its market price, the principal has two distinct and cumulative remedies. He can recover such bribes from the agent as money had and received to his use, and may also, "without deducting the above amounts, recover from the agent and the briber, jointly or severally, damages for any loss he may have sustained by such purchase in excess of market rates. Mayor y etc.y of Salfordv. Lever y 25 Q. B. D. 363 (Eng.). Bills and Notes — Qualified Acceptance. — Acceptance of a bill of exchange "in favor of" the payee "only," does not render the bill non-negotiable. It is not a qualified, but a general, acceptance. Decroix &> Co. v. Meyer &" Co.y 25 Q. B. Div. 343 (Eng.). Contracts — Action by Beneficiary. — B., for a consideration, contracted to support A.'s wife, and save A. and his estate free from all claims by her, and gave ' U. S. V. Reynolds, q8 U. S. 145. ^ For example. Com. v. Mash, 7 Met. 472. 8 Com. V. Mink, 123 Mass. 422. * Reg. v. Bradshaw, 14 Cox, C. C. 83. 6 Reg. V. Jackson, 7 Cox, C. C. 357.