Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/343

THE SUGAR BOUNTIES. '327 By Statute 1872, chap. 364, the city of Boston was authorized, at a session of the legislature called largely for that purpose, to issue bonds to the amount of $20,000,000, the proceeds to be loaned to persons whose property had been destroyed by the great Boston fire, under conditions carefully conceived for the security of the loan. The situation is graphically described in the argument of the eminent counsel for the city (Hon. B. R. Curtis and J. G. Abbott, Esqs.): The main questions in the case are these : Can there be such a de- struction of property by fire in the capital city of the State, the main seat and centre of its wealth, industry, commerce and business, ihe pros- perity and advance of which are so intimately connected with its own, that the one cannot be touched without seriously affecting the other, as to justify the State in lending money to those whose property has been de- stroyed, upon ample security, to enable them to restore the city to its former condition? Can there be so general a calamity and destruction by fire, in a city owning more than a third of the taxable property of the State, and paying more than a third of the taxes for public pur- poses, as would justify the State, upon prudential considerations, in lending a helping hand for the purpose of preserving her own resources and the mainsprings of her own prosperity ? Can there be a destruc- tion of property in such a city, by fire, so serious and calamitous as to interfere with the business of the people, the interests of labor, and the finances of the whole community, to such a degree as to justify the legislature in bringing to the aid of the sufferers a loan from the State, to avert some, at least, of the great public loss and suffering that would be occasioned by such a calamity? The Act, nevertheless, was held unconstitutional. The court hold: The power to levy taxes is founded on the right, duty and responsi- bility to maintain and administer all the governmental functions of the State, and to provide for the public welfare. To justify any exercise of tne power requires that the expenditure which it is intended to meet shall be for some public service, or some object which concerns the public welfare. The promotion of the interest of individuals, either in respect of property or business, although it may result incidentally in the advancement of the public welfare, is, in its essential character, a private and not a public object. However certain and great the resulting good to the general public, it does not, by reason of its comparative im- portance, cease to be incidental. The incidental advantage to the public, or to the State, which results from the promotion of private interests, and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money raised by taxation, or for which taxation may become necessary. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity, as justifying a tax,