Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/354

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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338 HAR VARD LA W RE VIE W. and navy of the United States. It has no right to raise money by tax- ation for religious purposes, or for a thousand things for which the State may impose taxes, and collect them of the people. (Lectures on Const., 104, 247.) A power to lay taxes for the common defence ana general welfare of the United States is not in common sense a general power. (1 Story, Const., § 922.) The power to lay taxes is a power exclusively given to raise revenue, and it can constitutionally be applied to no other purposes. The appli- cation for other purposes is an abuse of the power ; and, in fact, how- ever it may be in form disguised, is a premeditated usurpation of authority. (1 Story, Const., § 963.) To Judge Story, the suggestion that this power to levy taxes for the general welfare was an unlimited one seemed entirely absurd. To consider the latter phrase not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please which might be for the good of the Union, wculd render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless. It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States ; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would also be a power to do whatever evil they pleased. (1 Story, Const., § 926.) It may be observed further that in several at least of the cases of State taxation, the State legislature was expressly empowered to legislate for " the general welfare. 1 " 2. State Authorities do not apply. It is clear that this is a necessary part of the government's con- tention. The ground for it appears on page 67 of the government's brief, and can perhaps best be stated by the attorney-general him- self: We respectfully submit that they (the State decisions) have no applica- tion to this controversy. They are all of them cases of municipal taxa- tion, which must be for public municipal purposes. It is obvious that the establishment of a particular industry in one place by a bonus to specified private individuals is a very different object for taxation than the encouragement by the national government of a widespread in- dustry in many quarters of the Union for national purposes, with a view to diversifying the industries of the country and making it independent of other countries for necessities. 1 Const. Massachusetts, Pt. II. Ch. 1, Sec. i, Art. 4; Const. Maine, Art. IV. Pt. 3, § 1 ; Const. New Hampshire, Pt. i, Art. 31; Pt. 2, Art. 5; Const, of Georgia, Art. III. Sec. 7 §22.