Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/365

RECENT CASES. 349 parent, and should that be the case the time for her gift may n->t fa'l within the required limits; the gift is therefore too remote. If X is alive at the time of the testator's death, then the only thing to hipp.n is her reaching twenty-four, and as that must happen, if at all, in her life- time, and she is alive at the testator's death, the gift to her cannot be too remote. Let us now look at the case as it really arose, a gift under an exclu- sive power to G to appoint among his children, and an appointment by his will of independent sums to those of his daughters who should reach twenty-four, the daughters being some more and some less than three years at the time of his death. Of course the daughters under three could not take ; could those more than three years old take ? As the gifts are separable, the fact that there were or might be other daughters who could not take would not invalidate the gifts to those who were over three years of age. But were those gifts in themselves good? If, to use the common phrase, the words of the appointment are read into the instrument creating the power, then we shall have the case we have just been considering, and the legacy to the daughters would be bad, except to those living when the power was created. This phrase, however, is not in all respects correct. The word " daughters " should have given to it the meaning which the donee gave to it ; that is, of certain individual girls, having in fact certain names and certain ages, e.g. A who is six years old, B who is five years old, C who is four, years old, D who is two years old. But it must be ob- served that the being of these ages is not a condition which the donee has attached to the appointments. As the intention of the donee was to appoint to particular persons, those persons' names may be read into the creating instrument, but the qualities of those persons cannot be read into the creating instrument as conditions for the gift, unless the donee has made them so. Therefore if we call an appointee unborn at the time of the creation of the power X, it was not then certain that the gift to X, in the case we are considering, might not take effect beyond the required limits. If the appointment had been to such of the donee's daughters as should be three years old at his death, upon their reaching twenty-four, the gift would have been good, because at the creation of the power no legatee answering the required description could possibly take at too remote a time. Wilkinson v. Duncan therefore would seem to be wrong, and also, a fortiori, Von Brockdorff v. Malcolm, 30 Ch. D. 172, which pro- fesses to rest upon it ; and the attempt in the Addendum, Gray, Perp., p. xxxiii, to support the latter case fails. RECENT CASES. [These cases are selected from the current English and American decisions not yet regularly reported, for the purpose of giving the latest and most progressive work of the courts. N<> pains are spared ir. selecting all the cases, comparatively few in number, which disclose the general prog, ress and tendencies of the law. When such cases are particularly suggestive, comments and refer- ences are added, if practicable.] Admiralty — Statutory Liability of Owner. — A steam-propeller was wrecked and abandoned to the underwriters as a total loss. It was subseauently taken in tow by a wrecking-master, but sank within twenty-four hours, and one