Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/220

204 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. physical injuries, — what sort of physical or corporal harm may be the subject of a claim. Mere touching of the person may be, while mere touching of personal property once was not. Physical illness of course is. Whether nervous derangement may be, when not brought about through corporal violence, and whether mere fright, with or without corporal violence, may be, is still the sub- ject of discussion. Forms of annoyance, such as disagreeable odors, sights, and sounds, are usually said to be the subject of recovery only in connection with the ownership of real property. There must in all such cases be a degree of inconvenience worth taking systematic notice of. The content of the right to land is also here concerned, including the right against mere intrusion upon the air space, against the cutting off of surface or subter- ranean water, etc. The nature of the harm known as Conversion must also be treated here. The social relations must be enumer- ated with which interference is forbidden, and the words known as Libel and the words deemed slanderoqs /^r j-^ are to be discussed. The facts vesting the rights of patent and copyright, and the mat- ters as to which we have a " right to privacy," and several other modes of harm, involve also some statement of the Damage element. A good illustration of the necessity for distinguishing between the points of view of the Primary and the Secondary limitations is found in the current discussion of the right to recover for ner- vous illness, or for mere terror (without illness) caused without corporal violence. From the former point of view the question is whether such harm may be the subject of recovery at all ; whether the elusive or temporary character of the harm makes it difficult or not worth while to consider it; whether the opportunity for simu- lation of illness, or for aggravation of it by the general effect of the imagination or by the particular weaknesses of individuals, does not warn us to be cautious in sanctioning such claims. It is appar- ent that from this point of view the result might be one for cases of positive nervous derangement, and another for mere temporary fright. But, assuming that such harm may be the subject of a recovery, we have still to consider each case from the point of view of the Responsibility element, i. e. to say whether this par- ticular defendant should be made responsible for this particular injury under the circumstances (^e. g. whether he was negligent or not) ; and it is apparent that we may still from this point of view deny the present plaintiff's right to recover against the present