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236 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. letter to have been sent out on a privileged occasion. It is true the defendant intended to use a privileged occasion, and thought he was doing so, but he was not. It does not matter that the defendant did not intend to injure the plaintiff. Curtis v. Mussey et al., 6 Gray, 261. The doctrine of the principal case, that the belief of defendant that the occasion is privileged does not make it privileged, harmonizes with the general rule that a mistake does not excuse. Shepheard v. IVhitaker L. R. 10 C. P. 502 ; Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co., 60 Hun, 319; Mayne v. Fletcher, 4 Man. & Ry. 311, 312, note ; Fox v. Broderick, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 453, 459. But see Hansoty. Globe Co., 159 Mass. 293. (Holmes, Morton, and Barker, JJ. dissenting.) Torts — Imputed Negligence. — An infant twenty-two months old, being left by its mother, wandered on the track of the defendant, and was struck and injured by a train through the negligence of the defendant's train hands. Held, that a child of tender age is incapable of contributory negligence, and that in a suit by the child the negligence of the parent cannot be imputed to it. Bottoms v. S. &' R. Railroad Co., 19 S. E. Rep. 730 (N. C). This case adds North Carolina to the list of States which repudiate the doctrine of imputed negligence. The decision seems entirely sound. Whatever question exists where the suit is by the parent, in an action by the child for injuries received the doc- trine is indefensible upon any theory. Torts — Malicious Prosecution. — The plaintiff set out that he was arrested upon the complaint of the defendant ; that the complaint was false and was known by the defendant to be false when he made it ; that the complaint was made without prob- able cause and maliciously, with intent to injure the plaintiff; that when before the court upon this complaint, in consequence of false statements made by the defendant, that it would benefit the plaintiff to plead guilty, and would terminate the proceedings against him, and would release him from arrest and imprisonment to do so, believing these statements, under duress and threats of long imi)risonment, and not knowing the consequences of his doing so, he formally pleaded guilty, though he was not guilty, as the defendant knew, and was sentenced to imprisonment, and imprisoned ten months. To this the defendant demurred. Held, that the plaintiff could recover, yohnson v. Girdwood, 28 N. Y. Supp. 251. See Notes. Trusts — Removal of Non-resident Trustee. — The New York Code, § 263, subdivision i, gives the superior city courts jurisdiction of any action to procure a judg- ment determining, annulling, or otherwise affecting an estate, title, or other interest in real property which is situated within the city where the court is located. Held, under this statute, that the courts of New York City have jurisdiction in an action to remove a trustee who resides outside the state, when the trust res is real estate in New York City. Paget v. Stevens, 28 N. Y. Supp. 549. The dissenting opinion points out that an action for removal of a trustee is prima- rily an action in personam, to determine the right of defendant to exercise the privi- leges and enjoy the profits of his trusteeship, and would confine the operation of the statute to actions in rem. This would seem the better view. Trust Deposit — Money paid to a Bank for a specific Purpose. — The complainant gave money to a bank in payment of a note and took a receipt, which was to be given up when the note was returned. On the bank becoming insolvent with- out paying the note, held, that the complainant was entitled to have the assets in the hands of the receiver applied to the payment of the note. That the money was paid to the bank for a specific purpose, and it was not the understanding of the parties that the bank might use it for any other purpose. It made no difference that the complain- ant's money could not be identified. It was sufficient that it could be traced to the vaults of the bank. Massey et al. v. Fisher, 62 Fed. Rep. 958. On principle it seems hard to make out a trust. It does not appear that the bank was expected to apply the money given by the complainant to the note. There is not much authority on the point, and what there is is conflicting. Wills — Erroneous Description. — Testatrix devised the southeast quarter of a certain section, which quarter-section she did not own. The southwest quarter did belong to her, and the devisee claims this under the will. The will recited her owner- ship of the southeast quarter. Held, devisee can take the southwest quarter under this clause, as extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the land devised (Kinne, J. dis^ senting). Eckfordv. Eckford, 58 N. W. 1093 (la.) This is the first time this question has arisen in Iowa, and the majority adopt the view of the majority in Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 20. This seems to be the better view. All extrinsic facts except direct declarations of intention can come in. See 6 Harv, Law Rev. 434, 10 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 93, and Riggs v. Myers, 20 Mo. 239. Opposed to this view are Hurtz v. Hibner, 55 111. 514, and 10 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 353.