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NOTES. 281 of the Northwestern Law Review (vol. iii. p. i). Mr. Hadley is not inch'ned to admit the existence of a right to privacy. " When an individual walks along the streets in the sight of all," according to Mr. Hadley, " he has waived his right to the privacy of his personality ; " and if a newspaper re- porter sketches him and publishes the sketch accompanied by a '* descrip- tion of the peculiarities of his appearance, walk, habits, and manners," — why, Mr. Hadley is sorry for the individual if it is distasteful. Mr. Hadley also makes the point that the right to privacy stretches equity jurisdiction beyond its proper limits. But it is not clearly set forth how it does so to a greater degree than any case of first impression does. And, finally, Monson v. Tussaud (10 The Times Law Reports, 199, 227, noticed 7 Harvard Law Review, 492), the most important recent English case on the subject, is not mentioned, though decided and com- mented upon more than six months before the publication of this article. Corliss V. Walker, 57 Fed. Rep. 434, came up a second time on Nov. 19, 1894, on a motion to dissolve the injunction restraining the use by the defendants of a picture of the late Mr. Corliss. Colt, J., decided that the injunction must be dissolved, Mr. Corliss being a public character, and his personal appearance therefore in a sense public property. On the rights of a private person the language is explicit. Colt, J., says that, Independently of the question of contract, I believe the law to be that a private individual has a right to be protected in the representation of his portrait in any form, that this is a property as well as a personal right, and that it belongs to the same class of rights which forbids the reproduction of a private manuscript or painting, or the pub- lication of private letters, or oral lectures delivered by a teacher to his class, or the revelation of the contents of a merchant's books by a clerk." The other branch of the case still stands for the proposition that one may write and publish about either public or private persons ; but, Mr. Corliss being held to be a public man, the remarks about private persons may be fairly said to be obiter, and the point open for the consideration which some gross case of invasion of privacy may soon require for it. Mr. Hadley 's article is well worth reading as the first attempt to make ft careful presentation of the reasons against the right to privacy. And the new cases are interesting as showing that the law on the subject is in no danger of becoming obsolete, but rather serves a real and useful purpose to an increasing number of complainants. What is the Reason for our Law of Confession? — The case of State V. Harrison, 20 S. E. Rep. 175 (N. C), raises an interesting ques- tion as to the admissibility of confessions obtained by promise of favor. The defendant, an ignorant and superstitious woman, was convicted of the murder of her husband. The court admitted in evidence a confes- sion obtained from her under the following circumstances. A detective disguised himself and, pretending to possess magical powers, so worked on her superstition that she believed him. He told her, " If you will tell me all about it, I can give you something so you can't be caught." Whereupon she confessed that she was the one who had committed the murder. The court above held this evidence admissible, on the ground that the promise was not one that would be likely to induce the defend- ant to tell an untruth. If she were really guilty, it would be a strong inducement to her to tell the truth ; but if she were not, there would be no incentive to tell a lie and say she was guilty.