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426 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. Conflict of Laws — Death by Wrongful Acts — Limitations. — By the statute of Montana giving a right of action for death the action must be brought within three years; by the statute of Minnesota but two years are allowed. 'J"he deceased was killed in Montana, and the action brought in Minnesota more than two years, but less than three years after the death occurred. Defendant set up the limitation in the Minnesota statute. Held, the limitation of the Montana statute governs. Tlierotix V. Northern Facific K. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 84, The court bases its decision on Boyd v. Clark, 8 Fed. Rep. 849, where it was held that where a statute gives a right of action unknown to the common law, and limits the time within which the action may be brought, the bringing of the action within that period is a condition to the right, and that if the action is brought in a foreign court after the period prescribed has elapsed, no recovery can be had. This proposi- tion does not seem to necessitate or sustain the holding of the court in the principal case. Limitations usually are governed by the lex fori, and cases like Boyd ^wA Clark form a notable exception to that rule. Plaintiff here has complied with the condition upon which the Montana statute gave her the right ; but, it is submitted, she should not recover in a jurisdiction whose laws provide that no action of this sort shall be brought after a specified time, which time has elapsed. Constitutional Law — Common Law of the United States. — Held, by Grosscup, District judge, affirming his decision reported in 58 Fed. Rep. 858, that there is no common law of the United States, and that therefore prior to the passage of the Literstate Commerce Act no recovery could be had from a common carrier for excessive charges for carriage between States ; since interstate commerce is a subject over which State laws cann(jt extend, and no law applicable to it had at that time been made by the United States. Swift v. Philadelphia &> A'. K. Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 59. Li his opinion in this case Judge Grosscup ably maintains the position he has assumed, in spite of the contrary decision of Judge Shiras in Murray v. Chicago &* Northwestern By. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 24. ^ See Notes, 7 Harvard Law Review, 488; 8 Harvard Law Review, 168. Constitutional Law — Due Process of Law — Interstate Commerce. — A New. York statute required that all goods made by convict labor in any State, except New York, should be labelled " convict made," before being exposed for sale. I/ekl, the act was unconstitutional ; first, because it operated upon property owned at the time it took effect ; and secondly, because it discriminated between convict-made goods of foreign States and those of New York. People v. Hawkins, 31 N Y. Sup. 115. The second ground for the decision of the case is unquestionably correct, but the first is less satisfactory. It is evident that the direct result of such a requirement as this statute imposes would be to put convict-made goods in contempt and restrict their sale. But however this may be, it is none the less within the power of the legislature to enact such a statute, and this the court does not deny, but it insists that the regula- tions should operate only on those goods manufactured or imported after the passage of the act. In support of this position the court relies upon the case of Wyiithavur V. People, 13 N. Y. 378, which is no doubt to the same effect as to an invasion of vested rights. Such a distinction cannot be approved. Hare's Const. Law, pp. 776, 777. The better view would seem to be to regard such regulations, provided they are fair and reasonable, with whatever restrictions they may incidentally involve, as within the customary power of the legislature, the legitimate exercise of which is not precluded by the Constitution. Hare's Const. Law, pp. 765, 766. Constitutional Law — Liquor License — S.-vle. — The respondent, an incor- porated society of limited membership, maintained a club-house in St. Louis. Wines and liquors were served without profit to the members and their guests upon the former's acknowledging the receipt of the liquor and its price, which was thereupon charged to the account of each, to be paid monthly. The club was not licensed under an act regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors. Held, a distribution of liquor belonging to the club among its several members is not a sale within the act. Each member receiving the liquor was a co-owner with all the other members, and the trans- action was a mere transfer of the special property of the other members to him. State ex rel. Bell v. St. Louis Cliih. 28 S. W. Rep. 604. If a legislature wishes to prohibit the use of liquor in club-houses, which it may doubtless accomplish, the statute for the purpose must do more than forbid its sale. When two or more are collectively the owners of property, they may unite in good faith in dividing it ; but if their association with the object of co-ownership is simply a device to defeat the law and evade the license fee, the courts will be quick to perceive the fraud and deal with it as such. The bona fides of the association is the test. The decisions fall on one side or the other, as this is made out. The case follows the gene-