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430 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. the vestry of the new church can be made, and there can therefore be no reason for the intervention of equity to aid in enforcing what does not exist. Evidence — Entries in Memorandum Book. — To prove the quantity of logs scaled during the winter, the defendants offered in evidence a book, kept by their fore- man, containing daily entries made by him. The foreman and F., the man who did the work, at the end of each day used to figure up the total amount of logs scaled during the day, from tally-boards kept by F., and the foreman set down the amount in the book in question. F. could not be found so as to obtain his testimony with regard to the scale. Held, the entries are not admissible unless supplemented by the testimony of the person furnishing the original data, since they were not made by one having a per- sonal knowledge of the facts which he recorded. Chicago Lumbering Co v. Htwitt, 64 Fed. Rep. 314. In Mayor, etc., of N. Y. y. Sec. Ave. Railroad Co., 102 N. Y. 572, where similar entries were let in, they were accompanied not only by the testimony of the foreman who made the entries, that he correctly entered the amounts as reported, but by that of the man who had personal knowledge, that he reported the facts correctly to his foreman. Unless accompanied by this supplementary testimony, it seems to be the general rule, as stated in the principal case, that the party making the entry must have personal knowledge of the fact which he records. (See cases cited in the opinion.) There has been, however, a slight relaxation in this rule in Curren v. Crawford, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 3, where the person making the entry knew nearly all the facts which he recorded, but not all ; and the entry was admitted without the supplementary testi- mony of the man who did the work. Insurance — Limitation in Policy. — A policy of insurance against death from an accident stipulated that an action thereon must be brought within one year from the date of the happening of the alleged injury. I/eld, that the limitation begins to run from the death of the insured, and not from the time at which the right of action accrues. McFarland v. Railway Ace. Ass'n, 38 Pac. Rep. 347 (Wyo.). In fire insurance policies, the courts have gone very far in holding similar clauses to run only from the accruing of a right of action, in analogy to the statutes of limitation. r>ut in the principal case the court refuse to follow these authorities in interfering with the plainly expressed intent of the parties, and say that in accident policies at least, the language must govern when clear. This would seem right on principle, though, doubtless, a scintilla of ambiguity would be seized to avoid the result. Persons — Husband and Wife — Right of Husband's Creditors to Profits OF Wife's Estate. — Where a husband engaged in business with his wife's capital in her name, on her credit, and for her benefit, and owing to his labor and special skill large profits accrued, held, after deducting the necessary expenses and indeljtedness of the business, and the support of the family, a court of equity will apportion the profits between the wife and the existing creditors of the husband. Boggess v. Rich' ard's Adm'r, 20 S. E. Rep. 599; Vance v. Richard's Adnir, 20 S. E. Rep. 603. This decision is opposed to the generally accepted rule of law that a man may give away his labor, but it is supported by many dicta, and by at least one decision, Murphin V. Taylor, 16 Ohio St. 509, and seems eminently fair. The courts go on the principle that anything beyond the usual profits, due to the husband's labor and skill, is not properly a part of the profits of her separate estate, but is the result of the husband s skill, and that to allow the wife to take it all would be a fraud upon the husband's creditors. Persons — Presumption of Coercion of Wife by Husband. — Mary Moore was convicted of perjury at the trial of her husband and excepted on the ground that the rulings below were not correct. Those rulings, evidently, were that there was the presumption that she acted under the control of her husband, but it could be rebutted. Held, rulings were correct. Under the Massachusetts statute which pro- vides that the wife shall not be compelled to be a witness on the trial of the complaint against her husband, the fact that she takes the stand, is evidence to rebut the pre- sumption. Lathrop, J., also says that where a wife testifies in a complaint against her husband under the statute in question, there is no room for the application of the rule that there is a presumption of coercion. Cotntnonwealth v. Moore, 38 N. E. Rep. 1120 (Mass.). This presumption of coercion in criminal cases seems to have preserved a place in our law long after all reason for it has passed away. Under our Married Women's Acts the wife is a very independent person, and the rule, founded on mediaeval concep- tions, seems inapplicable. In the Penal Code which Stephen, Plackburn, and others prepared, it was proposed to abolish this presumption. The fact that the courts refuse to apply it in the cases of heinous crimes would also seem to show that it has no foun- dation in fact. The courts might have said that the Married Women's Acts took away