Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/77

RECENT CASES. 6 1 know that there was but one Dublin in the world. In the principal case, however, to call the Interstate Commerce Act into operation, it was only necessary to show that, under the contract, it was contemplated that goods should pass through a foreign State ; and as there were no cities in the State of New York of the name of Kansas City, or Wichita, it was matter of common knowledge that goods in passing from those cities must come within the operation of the Act. Evidence — Reformation of Df.ed for Mistake. — J/e/i/, that a court of equity will reform a deed conveying a quit-claim interest in land, upon proof that the parties to it intended to pass a life estate only. Deischer et ux. v. Price et al., 36 N. E. Rep. 105 (111.). The law is undoubtedly as above stated. Courts of equity reform deeds when upon outside evidence it appears that they are founded upon mistakes as to material facts. Chamberlayne's Best on Evidence, 219 National Banks — Insolvency and Receivers — Allowance of Claims — Collateral. — Creditors of a national bank, in proving their claims, cannot be required to allow credit for collections made after the date of the declared insolvency. The receiver of a national bank objected to the claim of a creditor, on the ground that money collected on collateral, (i) before and (2) after proving its claim, should be cred- ited to the claim. Held, the effect of the national bank act is that, after suspension, the right which the creditor had to levy an execution to satisfy his judgment is exchanged for an interest in the assets held Dy the receiver. This interest is fixed by the full amount of his debt at the time of the declared insolvency, and is not affected by any subsequent reduction of the debt. Chemical Nat. Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed. Rep. 372 (Ohio). The question is a new one in the Federal courts, and is carefully considered both on principle and on the authorities. The weight of authority in this country and in England supports the decision on the point that no credit can be required for collec- tions made after proof of claim ; but the only English case cited holds the contrary as to payments made before proof, and the cases in this country are divided. As the learned judge points out in his opinion, there seems no good reason for distinguishing the cases. Partnership — Bankruptcy — Earnings of Personal Skill. — The bankrupt carried on business in partnership as a dentist. Held, that his business returns were not personal earnings within the meaning of the rule which allows a bankrupt to retain personal earnings, and therefore, such returns passed to the assignee in bankruptcy. In re Rogers [1894], i Q. B. D. 425 (Eng.). The line lies somewhere between the case of a bone-setter, of an actor, or a singer, " whose earnings depend really upon the personal exertion of the bankrupt, and on nothing else," and the case of a surgeon-apothecary, who sells medicines, or of an architect, who sells plans, or, as in the present case, of a dentist, who has a stock-in- trade and assistants, and whose earnings, although largely the result of personal skill, form the basis of a partnership agreement. Partnership — Who are Partners. — A was to furnish a house for a shooting- gallery. B was to fit it up, furnish the necessary apparatus, and manage the business. The profits were to be divided. Held, the portion of profits going to A was purely a compensation for the use of his house. He would have to bear no losses. Such a con- tract is not one of partnership. Pullatn v. Schinipf, 14 So. Rep. 488 (Ala.). The contract was simply for a lease, the rental to be determined by the profits made out of the shooting-gallery. It was well settled that such an agreement does not consti- tute a partnership. Holmes .R.R. Co., 5 Gray, 58. Whether a given contract is one of partnership is in a close case a most difficult question, and no test can be given, from a practical point of view satisfactory. Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. C. 268, laid down the doctrine that participation in profits is not a conclusive test. The case of Walker v, Hirsch, 27 Ch. D. 460, indicates that even a sharing in both profits and losses does not necessarily involve a partnership. It is said in Parsons on Partnership (4th ed.), § 46 : " Parties become partners only by agreeing to enter into an association which the law regards as a partnership. . . . Whether such an association is intended to be formed is a question of fact in each case. . . . The formation of a partnership is the creation of a body apart from the partners, for business purposes, for which the partners are to act and not directly for each other." This test, which makes a partnership depend on the intention to create an entity, and not on mere incidents of the relation like profit-sharing, is the only one which will reconcile the cases. Moreover, this entity view is expressly recognized by some of the best considered recent cases, Meehan v. Valentine, 145 U. S. 611 ; and is certainly the only one in harmony with the intention of business men. Bank v. Thompson, 121 N. Y. 280.