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224 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. sion — unnecessary for the decision of the case at bar — as to the interpretation of the term public use in connection with the law of Eminent Domain. Property — Innkeeper's Lien — Goods of Third Party. — Held, that an inn- keeper has a lien on all the baggage of a guest which he is bound to take in, even where he has notice that it is not the property of the guest. Robins &= Co. v. Gray, 1 1 The Times, Law Rep. 569. See Notes. Sales — Retention of Possession by Vendor.— Plaintiff, an indorser on a note made by a shoe company, bought from the company a lot of goods in return for a promise to assume the note. The company was allowed to keep possession of the goods ; later it became insolvent. Plaintiff recovered in detinue against the assignee. The lower court sat without a jury, and the upper court affirmed the judgment. King V. Levy, 22 S. E. Rep. 492 (Va.). Here is another refreshing stand against the doctrine that retention of possession by the vendor is fraud in law. The doctrine, however, has a hold in over one-third of the American jurisdictions. See Bennett's note in Benjamin on Sales, 6th ed., 458. Torts — Death by Wrongful Act — Survival of Actions. — Held, an ad- ministrator cannot maintain two actions for negligence resulting in death, — one as trustee for next of kin of deceased under Lord Campbell's Act, and another for damage to the person of deceased under a statute for the survival of actions. Lubrano v. At- lantic Mills, 32 Atl. Rep. 205 (R. I.). In general a person may sue in different capacities to obtain redress for the same wrongful act. Freeman on Judgments, § 235 a. Black on Judgments, §§ 536, 745. The construction of the act for survival, that it is intended to embrace only damages to the person other than those which result in death, and that it was not intended to give a remedy additional to Lord Campbell's Act, has been the construction commonly given to similar statutes in other States. See cases cited in the opinion. In Massachusetts, however, both actions may be maintained. Bowes v. City of Boston, 155 Mass. 344. Torts — Deceit — Honest Intentions. — Defendant wrote a letter which would be reasonably understood to warrant a certain title unencumbered. Plaintiff sustained loss by relying upon this interpretation of the letter. Held, that defendant might prove in defence that its letter was intended to convey a different meaning. Nash v. Minne- sota Title Insurance and Trust Co., 40 N. E. Rep. 1039 (Mass.). See Notes. Torts — Legal Duties. — Hdd, that in an action against a railroad company for an injury received through negligence an action of tort lies, whether a contract exist or not, or whether it be negligence of commission or omission. Kelly v. Raihuay, [ 1895] I Q. B. 944. See Notes. Torts — Negligence — Duty To Third Parties. — Defendant placed an elevator on trial in the building where plaintiff was an employee. Before it was accepted by his employer, and while still under supervision of the defendant, owing to its defective and improper construction, the elevator fell, severely injuring the plaintiff, who was near by Held, that, there being no contractual relation between the parties, nor any invitation by defendant to plaintiff, there was no liability on his part. Zeeman v. Kieckheffer Ele- vator Mnfg. Co.., 63 N. W. Rep. 102 1 (Wis.). While the court in this case seems clearly right in denying liability on the grounds of contract or invitation, it seems as clearly wrong in denying liability on other grounds. The defendant in building the elevator owed it as a duty to all persons rightfully in the building that it should be properly and safely erected. This it confessedly was not, to the damage of the plaintiff, for which damage the defendant's breach should render him liable. Recourse need not be had to the extreme doctrine of Blood Balm Co. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, to support this decision which seems to follow from the general doc- trine of liability for negligent injury. Trusts — Bequest — Charitable Trust. — //^/</, that a bequest of a fund to a yacht-racing association to apply the income to purchase annually a cup " to be pre- sented to the most successful yacht," etc., is void. It is not a charitable trust. In re Nottage,yones v. Palmer, ii The l^imes Law Rep. 519 (Court of Appeal). The case presents an interesting and novel question. The object of the testator was " to encourage the sport of yacht-racing ; " and the court based their decision on the ground that if there was any benefit to the community at large, it was too remote to warrant their establishing the gift as a charitable trust. Trusts — Charities. — 7/^/^^, societies for the suppression of vivisection of animals are charities within the technical sense in which the term charity is used in law. 1 1 The Times L .w Rep. 540. (Chan. Div., Chitty, J.)