Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/270

242 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, GENERAL AND PARTICULAR INTENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. A STATE Court of reputation has lately decided an important •^-^ question of common law contrary to every previous case. The question has come up repeatedly in the English courts as well as in the courts of many of the United States, and has al- ways been answered the other way. Yet the decision referred to is no careless or ignorant expression of opinion. It is a well con- sidered judgment, written with full appreciation of the unbroken authority against it. The case is Edgerly v. Barker, decided by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in an opinion written by Chief Justice Doe, and to be published in the 66th volume of the New Hampshire Reports, pp. 434-475, with advanced sheets of which I have been favored. Such a decision is an unusual occurrence and deserves examination. The case was this. Hiram Barker, a resident of New Hamp- shire, died, leaving a will and codicils which were duly proved. After sundry legacies, he gave the residue of his estate, real and personal, which was about $600,000, to trustees in trust to pay his daughter Clara $2,000 a year, and more if necessary for her com- fortable support; to pay $1,000 a year, or more in the discretion of the trustees, to his son, Hiram H. Barker, for the support of himself and his family, if fron? his habits and mode of life he should prove himself safe and competent to have the use and ex- penditure of the money ; if not, then the trustees to have the expenditure of the money for the same purpose ; to furnish means for the education of all the son's children, including those born after the testator's death ; if the son should "become and remain temperate, sober, and correct in his habits " for five years together, $5,000 to be paid to him, and at the end of ten years and of fif- teen years further sums if he should remain " perfectly temper- ate and of good and regular habits " ; and to pay to his son's wife, should she survive him, $500 a year or more at the trustees' discretion. Then came the clause under which the question arose. It pro- vided that the trustees should pay to each of said children of the