Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/359

FEDERAL RESTRAINTS. 331 III. State Regulation of Interstate Rates of Fare and Freight. The question of regulation of interstate rates of fare and freight by a State first arose in the Granger Cases, so called, decided by the Supreme Court in 1876.^ The judges were divided in their opinions, Waite, C. J., Clifford, Miller, Bradley, Swayne, Davis, and Hunt, JJ., uniting as the majority of the court, and Field and Strong constituting the minority. The first of the above cases, Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. lowa,^ involved the constitutionality of an act of the legislature of Iowa, establishing " reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freight and passengers " over the different railroads in Iowa. The complainant in the case was the lessee of the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad, which was incorporated under the laws of Iowa, and wholly situ- ate therein, although it was also engaged in interstate as well as intrastate commerce. The question in issue, among others, was whether such a statute was necessarily unconstitutional, as being in conflict with the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and the powers conferred thereunder upon Congress. The court, upon this point, said : — " The objection that the statute complained of is void, because it amounts to a regulation of commerce among the States, has been suffi- ciently considered in the case of Munn v. Illinois [94 U. S. 113]. This road, like the warehouse in that case, is situated within the limits of a single State. Its business is carried on there, and its regulation is a matter of domestic concern. It is employed in State as well as in interstate com- merce, and until Congress acts the State must be permitted to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people within its own jurisdiction, even though in so doing those without may be indirectly affected." That is to say, the broad doctrine was here laid down, that until Congress acted the several States had plenary control over the 1 Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155 ; Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 94 U. S. 164; Lawrence v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., ib. ; Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad Co. v. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179; Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Blake, 94 U. S. 180; Southern Minnesota Railroad Co. v. Coleman, 94 U. S. 181 ; and Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 181. ^94U. S. 155.