Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/368

340 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. mended and published by the State Railroad Commission should be final and conclusive as to what were equal and reasonable charges, and which allowed of no judicial inquiry before the commission, or otherwise, as to the reasonableness of said rates. The majority opinion, written by Blatchford, J., contains the following : — " In the present case, the return alleged that the rate of charge fixed by the commission was not equal or reasonable, and the Supreme Court held that the statute deprived the company of the right to show that judicially. The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving, as it does, the element of reasonableness, both as regards the company, and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States ; and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the law." Miller, J. concurred in a special opinion, and Bradley, Gray, and Lamar, JJ. dissented, saying, through Bradley, J., that the question was a legislative question, and not a judicial one, and expressing the opinion that the decision overruled the doctrine of the Granger Cases, as it undoubtedly does. The principle of the preceding case, however, has never since been overruled, but, on the contrary, has been several times ex- pressly approved. For instance, in Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Well- man,^ it was the opinion, that, while the legislature has power to fix rates, the right of judicial interference extends to a case of unreasonable rates. And such is the doctrine of Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ,2 where the cases upon the subject are reviewed by Brewer, J., who, however, is somewhat inaccurate in his expression of the scope of the decision in the Granger Cases. He there says: — " It is doubtless true, as a general proposition, that the formation of a tariff of charges for the transportation by a common carrier of persons 1 143 U. S. 339, 344. 2 154 u. S. 362.