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3S6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. tern of pleading used in New York. It is doubtful whether the decision would have been received by the press in general, as it has been, as a denial of tiie right to privacy, were the jurisdictions of law and equity distinguished, and certainly it would have been more easily limited to its proper scope. As has been intimated, it cannot fairly be complained of, however much some of the reasoning of the opinion may seem to need further exegesis to gain acceptance. RECENT CASES. Agency — Liability of Servant to Third Persons. — The agents of a cor- poration charged with the duty of erecting on its grounds structures for the accommo- dation of the public negligently permitted a defective structure to be erected. Held, that they were guilty merely of nonfeasance, and therefore were not liable to persons injured hy reason of such defects. Van Antzvei-p v. Linton et al., 35 N. Y. Supp. 318. There is no doubt that when an agent is guilty merely of nonfeasance he is respon- sible therefor to his principal alone. Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 472 ; Felton v. Swan, 62 Miss. 415. It is when we attempt to draw the line between nonfeasance and mis- feasance that the question becomes a puzzling one. The court here follows previous decisions in New York, as well as the weight of authority in other jurisdictions, in limiting the definition of misfeasance to the violation of a duty imposed upon the agent independently of his employment. Burns v. Pethcal, 75 Hun, 437 ; Delaney v. Rochereau, 44 Am. Rep. 456. By the terms of this definition, nonfeasance only can be attributed to the defendants ; and there would seem to be no good distinction between the negligent performance and the negligent omission of performance of a duty imposed by an employer, when in both cases injury results to third persons. The authorities are not wanting, however, which declare the first to bie misfeasance, and the second nonfeasance. Osborne v. Morgaji, 130 Mass. 102. Bills and Notes — Anomalous Indorser — Guarantor — Statute of Frauds. — Defendant indorsed in blank a note after delivery and while in the hands of payee. Parol evidence showed that he intended to assume the liability of guaran- tor. Held, such act authorizes the payee to write over the signature the contract of guaranty in full, and this constitutes a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Peterson v. Russell, 64 N. W. Rep. 555 (Minn.). This is the first time the point in question has come up for decision in Minnesota. The authorities are divided. In accord, see Kealing v. Vansickle, 74 Ind. 529 ; Beck- with V. Angell, 6 Conn. 315; Stowell v. Raymond, 83 111. 120. C/iaddock v. Vanness^ 35 N. J. Law, 517, cited by the court as authority, is not in point. The New Jersey decisions are contra to the principal case. See Hayden v. Weldon, 42 N. J. Law, 128. For further authorities holding that a blank indorsement of a note in the hands of the payee does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds, and that payee has no authority to fill in the contract of guaranty, see Temple v. Baker, 125 Pa. St. 634; Cnlhertson v. Smith, 52 Md. 628, For the three doctrines applied where the anomalous indorsement is made before delivery to payee, see 7 Harvard Law Review, t;]-}^. Carriers — Sleeping Cars — Right to Transfer Use of Section for Part OF Journey. — Held, that a purchaser of a sleeping car section, who leaves the train before reaching his destination, may transfer the use of the section to another pas- senger for the rest of the journey. Curlander . Pullman Palace Car Co. (Baltimore Superior Court). See Notes. Carriers — Wrong Ticket — Ejection from Train. — Held, that where a passenger requests and pays for a ticket to A. and by a mistake of the ticket agent is given a ticket to B. only, with which he enters the train without noticing the error, he has a right to ride to A. on making proper explanations to the conductor ; and can recover from the company for ejection by the conductor at B. Evansville &= T. H. R. R. Co. V. Cates, 41 N. E. Rep. 712 (Ind.). See Notes. Chose in Action — Assignment — Notice to Debtor — Priority. — Held,2i prior assignee of a chose in action will be protected, though he has given no notice of the assignment either to the subsequent assignee or the obligor. Fortunato v. Patten, 41 N. E. Rep. 572 (N. Y.).