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RECENT CASES. 359 same source, and are entirely free from control by the central government. In accord with the principal case are State v. Le Blanch, 2 Vroom, 82 ; State v. Beall, 15 Ind. 378 ; and see the dissenting opinion of Thomas, J., in Cojnm. v. Holder, supra. Criminal Law — Murder and Manslaughter. — Defendant was indicted for the murder of a person who attempted to arrest him without a warrant. The court charged that such unwarranted arrest was in general sufficient provocation to reduce the crime to manslaughter, " unless such killing was done in such a way as to show brutality, barbarity, and a wicked and malignant purpose." On conviction this writ of error was brought. Held, that the question of manslaughter or murder does not depend on the way in which the killing was done, and that the charge was erroneous. Broiun v. United States, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 29. This is^a sound decision. The question of fact for the jury is whether a certain state of mind existed in the defendant at the time of killing. This they must do from evi- dential facts, but it is not for the judge to charge that any particular facts are con- clusive. See Terre Haute, ^c. Railrcad Co, v. Voelker, 129 111. 540. Damages — Eminent Domain. — Where a city opens a street across the right of way of a railroad, the verdict of a jury giving nominal damages only is sustained. Chicago, dr»<r. Railroad Co, v. Cicero, 41 N. E. Rep. 640 (111.). There was evidence in the case of a depreciation in value of that part of the right of way occupied by tracks, and the market value of the part not so occupied was also shown. But the court says that the usual rule of compensation to individuals does not apply to this case, and refuses to allow any recovery. The cases cited would seem to show that this is the established doctrine in Illinois. It does not seem satisfactory, however, the better rule being that laid down in B. &= A. Railroad v. Cambridge, 159 Mass. 283: " The ruling that the petitioner was entitled to recover for the fair value of its land taken, subject to its use for railroad purposes, was correct." Equity — Injunction — Religious Corporations. — Where a church has been incorporated under a State statute as a member of a particular denomination, and acquired property as such, it cannot, without the unanimous consent of its members, transfer its property to another branch of the denomination which holds different doc- trines. Park et al. v. Champlin et al., 64 N. W. Rep. 674 (la.). Where property to which no specific trust is attached has been acquired by a church which professes a particular faith, there is some diversity of opinion as to the rights of a majority of its members in case they wish to change their allegiance. The New York courts, interpreting their statute, do not recognize any denominational char- acter in religious corporations, and the rights of a majority therein are the same as in any lay corporation. 2 R. S. of 1813, § 3; Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N. Y. 243; Wat- kins V. Wtlcox, 66 N. Y. 654. Michigan has followed New York in this respect. Wilson V. Livingstone, 99 Mich. 594. As a general rule, however, in the case of churches which acknowledge themselves members of a larger communion which exercises a more or less efficient supervision over their belief, the minority which is in accord with the tenets of the governing body will be given the property as against a seceding ma- jority. See Smith v. Pedigo, 33 N. E. Rep. 777 (Ind.) ; Church v. Whitmore, 83 la. 147 ; Roshis Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 462 ; Baker v. Ducker, 79 Cal. 365. Estoppel — Misrepresentation of Boundary by Vendor. — Plaintiff bought a lot of land adjoining defendant's lot. In erecting a building thereon he built up to a line, pointed out by defendant as the boundary, but which in fact was several feet within defendant's lot. This action is brought in equity to enjoin defendant's inter- ference with his possession. Held, that though defendant was in " honest error," he is estopped to deny the boundary indicated by himself. Ross et al. v. Penn etal., 64 N. W. Rep. 283 (la.). This case indicates the present tendency of the doctrine of estoppel. According to the overwhelming weight of earlier authority, no representation estopped its maker unless it was made with knowledge of its falsity, or at least when he was "bound to know the true state of things." Bigelow on Estoppel, 5th ed., chap, xviii. sec. 3. In this light, on much the same facts as found in the present case, an opposite conclusion was reached in Liverpool Wharf v. Prcscott, 7 Allen, 494. Authorities are being found more plentifully every year in support of the position that wilful falsehood or reckless ignorance is not necessary to create an estoppel ; that it is enough if a representa- tion has been made in pure error, on which the other party has been induced to act. Bispham's Principles of Equity, 5th ed., §§ 283, 2S8, and cases cited. Evidence — Character — False Imprisonment. — Held, evidence to establish the previous good character of plaintiff in a suit for false imprisonment is inadmis- 47