Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/490

462 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, These three decisions suggest a curious question, that might arise under the statute in those States in which the statute simply makes certain agreements invalid, without expressly forbidding the introduction of evidence as to the terms of the agreement. Let us suppose a case where A., on November 15, 1893, makes with B. an oral agreement for B.'s employment for one year, to commence January i, 1894. On January i, 1894, B. enters upon the perform- ance of this agreement. On January 15, 1894, B. says to A., that inasmuch as the agreement of November had not been reduced to writing, he wishes it confirmed now that the year had begun to run, and so as to take it out of the statute ; to which A. replies that that is satisfactory to him. In fact, the terms of the original oral agree- ment are not fully rehearsed in this conversation. B. is discharged without cause, and sues upon the agreement as made in January, 1894. To prove its terms he offers testimony as to both negotia- tions, the one of January 15, 1894, as well as that of November 15, 1893. Is the evidence as to the earlier agreement competent, as against the objection that it was not to be performed within a year, and should therefore have been in writing? This is of course not the common case of reference to some other writing in the written memorandum mentioned in the statute. The statute, let it be re- membered, does not require the agreement itself to be in writing, for it sanctions the alternative of " some memorandum thereof," etc.^ The agreement of January i^jth is of course valid, for aught that the Statute of Frauds provioes, but how shall its terms be proved? It would seem that to permit parol evidence of the oral agreement of November to be introduced (and that proof is necessary to make it sufficiently definite to be enforceable) would bring the case within the mischief, if not the letter of the statutory prohibition. And yet it is not at all clear that the New York, Massachusetts, and Michigan courts, which decided the above three cases, would so hold, if the question came before them. The jurisdiction of courts of equity, in cases of actual fraud, may be admitted, both on principle and authority, to be ample and sufficient, and whether the Statute of Frauds or any other be involved. But the statute itself is as binding on a court of equity as on a court of law. The mere moral wrong of the defendant in interposing the defence of the statute (if the idea of immorality can ever be predicated upon the assertion of a legal right) cannot 1 Leroux v. Brown, 12 C. B. Rep. 801.