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486 HARVARD LAW REVIEW^ it may not actually use the conduit, yet for the time being it prevents the cable com- pany from using it. The sound doctrine would seem to be that the electric company takes the road as it finds it, and must pay in proportion to the total original cost, whether they use the conduit or not — whether they use one rail or both rails. Equity — Degree of Specification for Discovery. — In an action for selling coal as plaintiffs' which in fact was not theirs, there were allegations that defendants had " on divers occasions taken orders from A. and divers other persons " in the sup- ply of which they had given coal as from plaintiff's mines which was not from there, and of a quality inferior to that. Sale to A. was admitted by defendants, but objec- tion was made to discovery and production of books till further specification of the alleged torts. Held, there is no definite rule governing the degree of ccncreieness in such allegations. This is not a case where plaintiffs are seeking to establish a possible claim from defendants' books. Discovery to precede the order to give particulars, Wayties Merthyr Company v. Radford ^ Co., [1896] i Ch. 29, No one can quarrel with such a case. The allegations were the only ones possible to most plaintiffs in the same circumstances, and the books of defendants v.ould be highly relevant to their substantiation. The rule against fishing is necessarily one of convenience to prevent the institutions of vexatious and baseless suits. Here there had been one distinct allegation which defendants had admitted in proceedings relative to the interim injunction. It is hard to see how a judge could have in reason demanded a full specification of the wrongful alleged sales without inspection of defendants' books, though plaintiffs might well be assured that there had been such sales by collat- eral circumstances such as they alleged in the depreciation in the price of their own coal. Equity — Judgment — Bill in Equity to Vacate. — Final judgment having been rendered in a suit, the defendant brought a bill in equity to have the judgment vacated on the ground of fraud, the fraud alleged being the false statement by the attorney of the plaintiff, out of court, that certain allegations in his complaint were true. Held, no ground for vacating the judgment. Town of Andes v. Millard, 70 Fed. Rep. 515. The recent case of Zellerbach v. Allenberg, 67 Cal. 296, lays down the rule that to vacate a judgment on the ground of fraud, it must appear that the fraud was practised in the very act of obtaining judgment; for any fraud anterior to that is a defence available at law, and therefore concluded by the judgment. It is difificult to formulate a general rule in this class of cases, and the above is perhaps too comprehensive. See In re O' NeilVs Estate, 63 N. W. Rep. 1042 (Wis.) ; Noyes v, Loeb, 24 La. Ann, 48. The decision in the principal case, however, is clearly correct. Nothing appears to take it out of the rule stated above. Equity — Vendee's Lien — Consideration Wholly Paid. — M. agreed to con- vey to T. an undivided half of certain premises. T. gave the full consideration. M. died, having executed a trust deed to secure a loan, without conveying to T,, and T. filed this bill against her administrator for an account and a sale of the premises. Held, that, as specific performance is an inadequate remedy, plaintiff is entitled to a lien on the whole premises. Townsendv. Vanderwerker, 16 Sup, Ct, Rep. 258. It seems well settled now that a vendee has a lien for purchase money paid when specific performance is inadequate or impossible, on the same broad equitable grounds on which the vendor's lien rests. Galbreath v. Reeves, 82 Tex. 257 ; Wickman v. Robin- son, 14 Wis. 493; Wythes v. Lee, 3 Drew, 396 ; Rose v. Watson, 10 H. L. Cas. 672, In the principal case, strangely enough, though the whole consideration has been given, the equitalDle lien is better for plaintiff than specific performance. The result seems right. The plaintiff has an equitable title to half the premises. As M. charged the estate with a debt, her share should betaken first to pay that off, and so plaintiff should be allowed a lien on the proceeds of the sale after satisfaction of that debt. Evidence — Ancient Documents — Proof of Contents. — Where an instru- ment itself would be admissible without proof of execution, being over thirty years old, aud its absence is satisfactorily accounted for, held, that evidence of its contents was likewise admissible without proof of execution. Walker v, Peterseii, -^t^ S, W. Rep, 269 (Tex.), This is an interesting result from the application of two rules. The loss of the docu- ment being explained, secondary evidence of its contents was properly admitted, and, being an ancient document, proof of execution was unnecessary. Evidence — Hearsay. — To prove the age of a girl who had been abducted, the evidence of a school teacher, to whom the girl had told her age, was offered. It was rejected because the witness had to refer to her school record to show it, and without