Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/538

5IO HARVARD LAW REVIEW. B's duty to me and my correlative right against him are exactly defined by my instructions as made known to him by me. As so expressed, these are to hold the property ostensibly as owner, that is, by a legal title during the continuance of the relation, subject however to certain obligations to me as to management. It is a necessarily involved condition of these instructions that the -prop- erty so held shall be preserved as a distinct and permanent fund. 2. Suppose I deposit mojieys in the bank, and direct the batik to disburse them upon my order. Again we find a purpose of one to be accomplished by the act of another, and again we find the relation determined by the in- structions that are given by me to the bank. This cases differs from the previous one in that, while the bank becom'es the owner of the moneys deposited with it, it is under no obligation to pre- serve them as a specific fund. After it receives the moneys, it owes to its depositor an equivalent sum, and its obligation is to discharge that debt by payment to such persons at such times as the depositor by written order directs. 3. Suppose I direct A to build me a house, for which, when com- pleted, I am to pay him a stipulated sum. For a third time we have the original notion conceived by one mind, and the execution of it left to another; but there are ele- ments obviously distinguishing this case from the two last sup- posed. Of these the chief is that I am an obligor as well as A. My obligation, which is to pay the stipulated price, is however contingent upon two things; (i) the completion of the work, and (2) its conformity to the instructions contained in the agreement. This makes me substantially a purchaser, and that which I pur- chase is completed work. 4. Suppose I direct A to take charge of my horse, for which I agree to pay a stipulated sum. Again I am the creator of a purpose which I intrust to another to execute. And again the duty which A assumes to me is de- fined by the instructions which I give him. There is also a recip- rocal obligation on my part; but it is conditioned, not upon the satisfactory character of the work done, as in the last case, but upon the continuance of the labor ; that is to say, so long as A remains in my employ, I am in duty bound to pay the stipulated price, commonly called wages. If I would relieve myself from my obligation, I must terminate the relation. In other words, I am a purchaser, but that which I purchase is A's service, as opposed to his completed labor.