Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/363

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'FITNESS TO WIN'.
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perhaps; but the spirit which led to its study was anything but useless. The knowledge of what is inside carefully guarded forts is of course common to the Intelligence Departments in all navies and to any officer who takes the trouble to read the matter up. The German officers not only read it up but lectured on it to the petty officers who in turn lectured on it to the men.

Knowledge is not fitness to win,[1] but the spirit suggested by the men seeking after knowledge suggests the fitness. It suggests a very keen desire to 'kill the enemy' in the day of battle.

These views about various navies perhaps seem to have been put down with a candour that may in several cases be unpleasing to many. But they are not so much a matter of the navy concerned as of the race. The dividing line between fitness and the absence of it is rarely fully visible till there is a war, because fitness is made up of national qualities, which may in some cases atone for and in others negative the symptoms or lack of symptoms of fitness exhibited by the navies only.

In attempting to define Fitness to Win I feel like one groping for a fact in the darkness. Narrowed down to a 'desire to kill the enemy' it is, as already

  1. The Russian officers were quite au fait with most details of the Japanese Navy, while in the land operations Russian maps were always used where possible by the Japanese as being far more accurate and thorough than their own.