There is another very good reason for doing so, which is the imperative need for reducing the burden of taxation by conversion of the British debt on to a lower interest basis. If investments by trustees were confined in future to British debt, this restriction would evidently tend to raise the prices of the securities in which British debt is expressed and so would hasten the process by which the largest item in our national expenditure, and the only one which cannot be touched by any ordinary measures of economy, can be brought down by a rise in the market value of British credit.
It need hardly be said that the restriction could not be made retrospective, obliging all trustees who held securities other than those of the British Government to dispose of them. It is only suggested that future investments by trustees should be confined to the stocks which really give the assurance which is now so often assumed where it does not in fact exist. If this were done it would be very many years before any real difficulty would be experienced by trustees in supplying themselves with stock. In 1889 when they were confined to Consols, the, whole amount of Consols in existence was £552 millions. The British debt, other than Treasury bills and
