whose country had been invaded, whose towns had been assaulted, whose villages had been wasted, that had most right to ask for 'damages.' But in the interests of Europe they would consent to waive the letter of their last claims. They would admit their debts, and they would pay them; but that should be their last and only concession. No inch of French ground should be surrendered. In Scotland they would act as they pleased, and would not listen to dictation. Let the English evacuate Boulogne on the instant, and they should have their money. If they refused, the Dauphin would take it by force, and they should have nothing.
The Peace of Crêpy was bearing fruit. Paget said calmly that Boulogne belonged to England for the present by right of conquest; they meant to keep it, and by the Emperor's help they would keep it. He appealed to the Bishop of Arras. But Arras 'had no commission,' and would say nothing. Arras was sent to bring about a peace with France, not to discuss the obligations of other powers. The French felt their ground firm; they again clamoured for restitution, and 'they bragged of their force of thirty thousand men.'
What were the English to do? If the question had been merely whether the possession of a second fortress in France, in addition to Calais, was worth the continuance of the war—although as a naval station, and as a material guarantee for the settlement of other differences, the occupation was of no slight value to them—it might have been doubted whether the advantages were worth the price which they might cost. But the point
