Pope desired to recover the allegiance of England; and the Emperor, in spite of appearances, would help him as soon as he could, 'partly moved by a corrupt conscience, partly by ambition to reign alone, besides old grudges and displeasures.' The first necessity, therefore, was quiet, and the re-establishment of the finances at home; the second, effective alliances abroad. At home all promised to go well; as a foreign ally, the safest would be either Francis or Charles; Francis, if he would wait the eight years for Boulogne; Charles, if he would detach himself conclusively from the Holy See.
'But we see either of them,' he continued, 'so affected in his own opinion, and by daily experience we know so little faith to be given in either of their promises when the breach of the same may serve to their purpose, as to have cause to be at point to despair to find friendship in either of them longer than they may not choose.'
There remained the present overture from the Elector, which it might be equally dangerous to accept or to refuse. To accept would in all likelihood unite the Catholic powers in a league against England, and war would follow with all its risk and cost. To refuse was either to leave the Protestants to be crushed, or to alienate them probably for ever—to throw them into the arms of France; while France, thus strengthened, might drive the English from Calais as well as from Boulogne.
On the side of France he concluded that the danger
