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DEFEAT OF DIOOTSIUS. 44$, to hold themselves in reserve for pursuit, in case the attack proved successful ; or for protection to the retreating infantry, in case it failed.i Of this combined scheme, the attack upon the left or seaward side of the Carthaginian camp, by the Italiot division and the fleet in concert, was effectively executed, and promised at first to be successful. The assailants overthrew the bulwarks, forced their way into the camp, and were only driven out by extraordi- nary efforts on the part of the defenders ; chiefly Iberians and Campanians, but reinforced from the other portions of the army, which were as yet unmolested. But of the two other divisions of Dionysius, the right did not attack until long after the moment intended, and the centre never attacked at all. The right had to make a circuitous march, over the Geloan plain round the city, which occupied longer time than had been calculated; while Dionysius with the mercenaries around him, intending to march through the city, found themselves so obstructed and embarrassed that they made very slow progress, and were yet longer before they could emerge on the Carthaginian side. Probably the streets, as in so many other ancient towns, were crooked, narrow, and irregular ; perhaps also, farther blocked up by precautions recently taken for defence. And thus the Sicilians on the right, not com- ing up to the attack until the Italians on the left had been already repuLed, were compelled to retreat, after a brave struggle, by the concurrent force of the main Carthaginian army. Dionysius and his mercenaries, coming up later still, found that the moment for attack had passed altogether, and returned back into the city with- out fighting at all. Whether the plan or the execution was here at fault, or both the one and the other, we are unable certainly to determine. There will appear reasons for' suspecting, that Dionysius was not displeased at a repulse which should discourage his army, and fur- nish an excuse for abandoning Gela. After retiring again within the walls, he called together his principal friends to consult what was best to be done. All were of opinion that it was imprudent tc incur farther hazard for the preservation of the town. Dionysius now found himself in the same position as Diokles after the defeat 1 Diodor xiii. 109. VOL. x. 29oc