Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/151

SPINOZA: SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTES, MODES. 129 existence and action by another similarly finite and deter- minate thing or event, and this cause is, in turn, determined in its existence and action by a further finite mode, and so on to infinity (I. prop. 28). Because of this endlessness in the series there is no first or ultimate cause in the phenom- enal world ; all finite causes are second causes ; the primary cause lies within the sphere of the infinite and is God him- self. The modes are all subject to the constraint of an unbroken and endless nexus of efficient causes, which leaves room neither for chance, nor choice, nor ends. Nothing can be or happen otherwise than as it is and hap- pens {I. prop. 29, 33). The causal chain appears in two forms : a mode of ex- tension has its producing ground in a second mode of extension ; a mode of thought can be caused only by another mode of thought — each individual thing is de- termined by one of its own kind. The two series proceed side by side, without a member of either ever being able to interfere in the other or to effect anything in it — a motion can never produce anything but other motions, an idea can result only in other ideas ; the body can never determine the mind to an idea, nor the soul the body to a movement. Since, however, extension and thought are not two sub- stances, but attributes of one substance, this apparently double causal nexus of two series proceeding in exact cor- respondence is, in reality, but a single one {. prop. 2, schol.) viewed from different sides. That which represents a chain of motions when seen from the side of exten- sion, bears the aspect of a series of ideas from the side of thought. Modus extensionis et idea illins modi una eademque est res, sed duobus modis expressa (II. prop. 7, schol.; cf. III. prop. 2, schol.). The soul is nothing but the idea of an actual body, body or motion nothing but the object or event in the sphere of extended actuality cor- responding to an idea. No idea exists without something { corporeal corresponding to it, no body, without at the same ' time existing as idea, or being conceived ; in other words, everything is both body and spirit, all things are animated ^ {yi. prop. 13, schol). Thus the famous proposition results ;( Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerunt^-