sident. This king can make treaties under the check of two
legislative branches; the president can make treaties under
the check of one. This king can appoint the members of
the legislature to lucrative offices; so can the president:
and in both cases an appointment vacates the seat. This
king appoints the judges, and the officers who appoint the
juries; so does the president. Executive power in the
Knglish foi m, has sufficed to introduce and establish the
political elements of fraud and force. But the king of England is not elective. The inefficacy of election, to prevent
the abuse of accumulated power, has been shewn; we see
its inefficacy in the House of Commons, to shield the people
against the oppressions of the English executive power.
Cut the king of England, in the exercise of his patronage,
is not checked by a senate. The corruption of two wealthy
and numerous legislative bodies in England, is no proof,
that a small and poor one in America, can repel the addresses of an executive, glittering with prerogatives similar to
those which have dazzled all the English patriots for a century past.
Both the English king and our president are the exclusive managers of negociation; and secrecy is their common maxim. By negociation, foreign governments may be provoked; by secrecy, a government may delude and knead a people into a rage for war; and war is a powerful instrument for expelling the element of self government, and introducing that of force. This has been recently demonstrated in France. By negociation, secrecy and war, traitors convert a national detestation of tyranny into a tool for making tyrants.
The assembly of Virginia, in their resolutions of December 1798, after stating "that a spirit has in sundry instances been manifested by the federal government, to enlarge its powers," concludes "so as to consolidate the states by degrees, into one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable result of which would be, to transform the present republican system of the United States, into an abso-
