In the states, judicial power is secured against executive
imfluence in several modes. In two only, can a single will
appoint judges; in these, they are removable by an address
of two thirds of the legislature, and the governour is elected only for two years immediately by the people, in the
others, judges are appointed by numerous and popular
bodies, which can plant republican principles on the bench,
and invigorate them after they are planted. This fact, both
demonstrates the publick disapprobation of the judicial system of the general government, and discloses a remedy
against its becoming an executive implement.
And this remedy is sufficient, if we exclude the idea of converting judicial power into a political department. This is only attainable by bestowing publick confidence upon judicial power, and publick confidence can never be purchased, except by actual responsibility. AVeliere detect the false construction of the term " independence." The independence, dignity or power of an agent, is reflected from the confidence and power of his principal. By depriving the agent of this confidence, you rob him of his independence. No sovereign will confide in agents, not responsible to him; and therefore judicial independence of sovereign power, is the destruction of genuine judicial independence.
In England, the independence of judicial power was produced, by delivering it from the influence of executive power, and exalting it to a dependence upon the will of the sovereign; in the United States, the independence of judicial power is destroyed, by delivering it from the will of the sovereign, and degrading it nearly to the level from whence it was raised in England; it will therefore become the implement of executive power, for want of the confidence an<l SM[)port, begotten by a dependence on the sovereign, as it was in England on account of the same defect.
This we are conducted to the only mode of exalting judicial power into a political department, which would be conformable to our principle of division. It can only be effected by bestowing upon it the publick confidence, and that can only be bestowed by responsibility to the publick,
