tively or by representation, the executive and judicial power, or the whole uncontrolled legislature.[1]
"An hereditary monarch is the representative of the whole nation, for the management of the executive power, as much as a house of representatives is, as one branch of the legislature, and as guardian of the publick purse; and a house of lords too, or a standing senate, represents the nation for other purposes."[2]
It is impossible to utter a more positive censure of the policy of the United States than the first quotation. It assails the doctrine of conventions, which invests the people, by representation, with unlimited power. It assails all our constitutions, under which the people, by representation, possess an uncontrolled legislative and executive power. And instead of the sovereignty fully, fairly and honestly allowed to the people by our policy, it limits their rights to the subordinate privilege of consenting to law. A law is irrepealable by consent, and one, obtained by surprise, manacles a nation forever. This forlorn privilege of consent, accords with the English system, and beyond it all ought to be passiveness on the part of the people, according to Mr. Adams; if the polite concession of a nominal responsibility to them, does not in reality soften the assault upon the sovereignty of the people, as being only a naked compliment of a right without a remedy.
That Mr. Adams meant no more, results from a slight comparison of the two quotations. By one, it is said, "the people are no keepers at all of their own liberties when they hold by representation the executive and judicial power, or the whole uncontrolled legislative." By the other, "that hereditary monarchs and a house of lords, are in their functions, representatives of the nation." It is extremely difficult to discern a valuable representative quality in a king and house of lords, which the people cannot hold, without losing themselves the quality of being "keepers of
