Teng: On this issue you would know we support Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the resistance forces within the country and we support their position. And to put it frankly, we think if the United States is to place its hopes on Lon Nol or on any force you think would replace Lon Nol, that is not reliable.
Kissinger: We think it is possible to produce a negotiation, at the end of which Sihanouk could quite possibly emerge as the controlling factor. We think it is in his own interest to be totally dependent on one force. He should have many forces, factors to play with.
Teng: That is your idea.
Kissinger: It is our idea that it is possible to achieve a solution in Cambodia in which Sihanouk could emerge as the dominant force, yes.
Teng: As you wanted to discuss this specifically, we can.
Kissinger: All right.
Teng: But I think that is all for this morning.
Kissinger: That is probably right.
Teng: How should we proceed this afternoon?
Kissinger: It is up to you. We have not discussed normalization and we are prepared.
Teng: Perhaps we will invite you this afternoon to discuss what you didn't finish: bilateral relations and normalization. Because we will only have half an hour this afternoon. Tomorrow morning we can continue with our views.
Kissinger: That will be fine. That will be important.
Teng: 3:30 p.m. this afternoon.
Kissinger: At the Guest House?
Teng: Yes. It might be more convenient for you.
Kissinger: It is very courteous.
Teng: The same people?
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