�This Page Declassified lAW EO12958 96 -- USAm' H?STOR?CAL ST?x?s Buz[dt?# t?e Postwar Air Force curement program. ?2 Congress agreed to the TO-group plan and, in the Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949, stated that the Air Force of the Urnted States should have "an authorized strength of not to exceed seventy United States Air Force groups. "?'? However, this program very soon after its inceptmn was cut back to 48 groups by an economy.minded administra- tion and the original plan was not imple. mented until the Korean crisis arose.* Meanwhile Congress enacted Iegxslation which was to be of considerable importance to the Air Force procurement program, al- though several of the bills listed on the aforementioned legislative program for en- actment by the 80th Congress were to be delayed in passage until later sessions of Congress. One measure of significance to the Ah' Force procurement program was the Renegotiation Act of 1948 which provided for the insertion in defense contracts and subcontracts of renegotiation clauses, thereby making it possible to re-examine the terms of the contracts in order to elimi- I nate excessive profits made at the expanse of the goverlunent.? The Second Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1948, authorized the Secretary of Deiense to ?nvoke the Rene- gotiation Act of 1948 in any contract for the procurement of ships, aircraft, aircraft parts, and the constructxon of facihtie? or installations outside the United States by the Department of the Am Force. This in- vocation involved funds made available for obligation in the fiscal year 1949. ? Some changes were made in renegotiation pro- codurea by the Renegotmtmn Act of 1951, approved ?3 March 1951. This leguslation provided that contracts on which the amounts received or accrued during the fiscal year amounted to not over $250,000, and subcontracts amounting to not more than $?,000 in the fiscal year, should not bb subject to renegotmt?on. It also provided that contracts or subcontracts involving agricultural products and products of mines, oil wells, and gas wells; contracts of
- ?y .? 20-15, Organization of Air Force Cornba/? Wiugs,
?s ?e basic opera?al ?tt of the U?F in peace and war ACZB?y t Wing normally cons?d o? ?ne comba? group ?[th ?$ suppnrtin? units ?euceforth Air Force pl?nin? and pro?ammlng ?s done In ?rms ol ?n?s rather ? ?roup? subcontracts for transportation and power made with a common carrier; contracts or subcontracts made with certain tax exempt organizations; and contracts or subcon- tracts not having a direct or immediate connection with national defense all should be exempt ?rom renegotiation procedures. A Renegotiation Board, composed of five members, was set up as an independent e?ecutive agency to see that the provisions of this act were carried out. ? In the summer of 1949 USAF procure- ment activities were made the subject of an investigation by the House Committee on Armed Services. The investigation was sparked by charge? made by Representa- tive James ?.. Van Zandt (Republican, Pennsylvania), who questioned the methods by which the B-36 heavy bomber was pro- cured and expressed doubt of its value in the case of war. The use of the B-38, Its combat efficiency, and the methods by which it was procured were thoroughly vindicated after the committee heard the testimony of Sec. rotary oi the Air Force Symington, General Vandenberg, other leading USAF officers, and prominent roreraft manufacturers. 'a? In reference to this investigation, and the entixe controversy over strategic bomb- ing which rose out of it, the House Armed Services Committee, in its final report on unification, reached the unanimous con- clusion that the USAF had the primary re- sponsibili[y for conducting strategic bomb- rag. This report also stated that the nation must rely upon the professional judgment of the leaders of the USAF that the B.36 was its foremost weapon for carrying out xts strategic bombing mission and was capa- ble of doing the job. x?s The Senate also took action to secure full information on the armed services and their s?ato of preparedness m July 1950 when it established the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Commxttee by the authority of a Senate Resolution. The Preparedness Subcommxt- tee sought to find solutions to national de- fense problems rather than to simply ex- pose them. Hence it aided the Senate Armed Services Committee by providing lnforma. lion and reports on which it and Congress THIS PAGE Declassflied lAW EO12958
