nor of Zeno, but that of Alcibiades, of Aristippus, or Atticus.
Upon religion he shall speak, in reply to some trenchant opinion that his son had expressed: "The reason of every man is and ought to be his guide; and I shall have as much right to expect every man to be of my height and temperament, as to wish that he should reason precisely as I do."
In everything he is of the opinion that the good and the best should be known and loved, but that it is not necessary to make one's self a champion for or against everything. One must know even in literature how to tolerate the weaknesses of others: "Let them enjoy quietly their errors both in taste and religion." Oh! how far from such wisdom is the bitter trade of criticism, as we do it!
He does not, however, advise lying; he is precise in this particular. His precept always runs thus: do not tell all, but never tell a lie. "I have always observed," he frequently repeats, "that the greatest fools are the greatest liars. For my part, I judge of the truth of a man by the extent of his intellect."
We see how really he mixes the useful and the agreeable. He is perpetually demanding from the intellect something resolute and subtle, sweetness in the manner, energy at bottom.
Lord Chesterfield thoroughly appreciated the seri-
