Page:Letters of Junius, volume 2 (Woodfall, 1772).djvu/341

of the restraint was expressed, and did by law justify the commitment. The reason of the distinction is, that whereas, when the cause of commitment is expressed, the crime is then known, and the offender must be brought to the ordinary trial; if, on the contrary, no cause of commitment be expressed, and the prisoner be thereupon remanded, it may operate to perpetual imprisonment. This contest with Charles the first produced the act of the 16th of that King: by which the court of King's bench are directed, within three days after the return to the Habeas Corpus, to examine and determine the legality of any commitment by the king or privy council, and to do what injustice shall appertain, in delivering, bailing, or remanding the prisoner.—Now, it seems, it is unnecessary for the judge to do what appertains to justice. The same scandalous traffic, in which we have seen the privilege of parliament exerted or relaxed, to gratify the present humour, or to serve the immediate purpose of the crown, is introduced into the administration of justice. The magistrate, it seems, has now no rule to follow, but the dictates of personal enmity, national partiality, or perhaps the most prostituted corruption.