Page:Memoirs of Henry Villard, volume 2.djvu/87

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
1863]
REBUKE BY LINCOLN
71

demand elicited the following response: “In reply to your inquiry, if immediate means to-night or to-morrow, No. If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five days, Yes.” This extraordinary telegraphic incident was closed by a despatch dated Murfreesboro', June 24, 2.10 A.M., saying laconically: “Major-General Halleck, General-in-chief: The army begins to move at three o'clock this morning. W. S. Rosecrans, Major-General.”

In this connection I will also quote a telling rebuke from a letter of President Lincoln in reply to a long defence of his course which the General had sent to him:

Executive Mansion, Washington, August 10, 1863.

My dear General Rosecrans:

Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must have inferred more than General Halleck has intended as to any dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. I have not abated in my kind feeling for and confidence in you. I have seen most of your dispatches to General Halleck — probably all of them. After Grant invested Vicksburg, I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside; and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me it was exactly the proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness let me say, it so seems to me yet. Finding from your dispatches to General Halleck that your judgment was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told General Halleck I thought he should direct you to decide at once to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed in substance. Soon after, dispatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterwards, however, I saw a dispatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before, but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely; and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you