noble tone of sentiment, and beautiful calmness. I was much affected by Phædo, but think the argument weak in many respects. The nature of abstract ideas is clearly set forth; but there is no justice in reasoning, from their existence, that our souls have lived previous to our present state, since it was as easy for the Deity to create at once the idea of beauty within us, as the sense which brings to the soul intelligence that it exists in some outward shape. He does not clearly show his opinion of what the soul is; whether eternal as the Deity, created by the Deity, or how. In his answer to Simmias, he takes advantage of the general meaning of the words harmony, discord, &c. The soul might be a result, without being a harmony. But I think too many things to write, and some I have not had time to examine. Meanwhile I can think over parts, and say to myself, “beautiful,” “noble,” and use this as one of my enchantments.’
‘I send two of your German books. It pains me to
part with Ottilia. I wish we could learn books, as we
do pieces of music, and repeat them, in the author's
order, when taking a solitary walk. But, now, if I
set out with an Ottilia, this wicked fairy association
conjures up such crowds of less lovely companions,
that I often cease to feel the influence of the elect
one. I don't like Goethe so well as Schiller now. I
mean, I am not so happy in reading him. That
perfect wisdom and merciless nature seems cold, after
those seducing pictures of forms more beautiful than
truth. Nathless, I should like to read the second part
of Goethe's Memoirs, if you do not use it now.’
