attempted to conceal the extent of the catastrophe, but the people of Russia were not deceived. They knew only too well that the retreat from Galicia, the loss of Poland and the fall of the western fortresses were the greatest military disasters ever sustained by Russia.
The High Command made an attempt to mislead the Russian public and the Allies by explaining this disaster as a crisis in munitions and organisation. But it was a much larger and more serious crisis than that. It was a veritable revolution in the mentality of the Russian soldier. For the first time in his life, he began to think, to criticise and to judge for himself.
And the result was that the whole structure of the Russian army was shaken. The very foundations of discipline were lost. In the course of the war, the Russian soldier had more and more begun to distrust his officers; now he ceased to fear them. The Government could indeed replace the guns and munitions which were lost during the retreat. But never again was it able to inspire in the soldiers the confidence in their officers which they had lost. Frightfulness was tried again and again, but with results the reverse of those anticipated. The disintegration of the army had begun; nothing could arrest it.
There were many terrible checks after this crisis; there were many splendid victories. But the morale of the army was broken.
