Page:Michael Farbman - Russia & the Struggle for Peace (1918).djvu/119

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The Army and the Revolution
107

The conflicts and excesses between the soldiers and officers in Petrograd, and still more the grave tension between the High Command and the army at the front, made it quite obvious in the very first weeks of the Revolution that a simple return to the old discipline was impossible. The cleavage, and the distrust of the officers on the part of the soldiers, had gone too far. The policy which was recommended by the Provisional Committee of the Duma (Rodzianko's manifesto) was out of the question. Had it been followed, it would inevitably have led to absolute chaos and dissolution. It was obvious that, if anything could save the army and hold it together, it was the creation of a new authority in the place of the old "nachalstvo." Russia had to have either a democratic army or no army at all.

But the democratisation of the army, necessary as it was, was bitterly and relentlessly opposed by the united Moderate, Liberal and reactionary counter-revolutionary elements. They based their contentions mainly on the argument that a democratic army is impossible because the art of war demands great skill and expert knowledge on the part of the leaders. They drew sarcastic pictures of the strategy of elected committees of uneducated soldiers, or of bluejackets commanding warships, and so forth. But that was not the point. The Committees and Soviets never made the slightest pretence of interfering with the expert business of the General Staffs and of the officers. There was not a single resolution, not one article in the Socialist Press, which even suggested such a thing; and the opponents who raised such a storm of alarm and poured out such biting sarcasm were perfectly well aware of this fact. No: the democratisation of the army was not dangerous because the soldiers wanted to intervene in strategical questions. It was dangerous because a democratic army would inevitably intervene in political questions. Democratisation of the army was dangerous because it was bound to lead to democratisation of the war and of foreign policy. It was dangerous because it would