attitude of the people towards the coming Revolution and that of the Government. At first the people had thought that the Revolution could be deferred till after the war. Only gradually and very reluctantly they came to the conclusion that the Revolution would have to take place during the war and in spite of it.
The Government went through an analogous transition in their thought. At first they thought that the Revolution would be killed by the war and swamped by war enthusiasm. But when threatening defeat opened the eyes of the Government to realities, they began to be terribly afraid of revolution. But they, too, expected that revolution would not take place till after the war. However, as the spirit of revolution grew stronger at the one pole and the defeatist mood gained ground at the other, the Government began to feel that the sooner the war was over, the more easily they could crush the Revolution. Thus the Government, which had begun the war with the idea of avoiding the Revolution, came to the idea of making peace in order to prevent the Revolution.
In this country and in France attempts have recently been made to deny that the Tsar's Government ever entertained the idea of a separate peace. I do not want to discuss the motives of this manœuvre, but I would only like to emphasise that this whitewashing of the Tsar's Government contradicts all the established facts. A separate peace was not concluded, not because the Government did not cherish the idea, but because it was afraid of the army and the people. As soon as the rumours of an intended separate peace became more definite, such an outcry was raised by the people and the army that the Government hastened to withdraw the idea in favour of a renewed outburst of warlike ardour. This is the origin of the periodical declarations of the Tsar and the Government about "war to the finish" and so forth.
The Government was in a dilemma. Then came Protopopov, and introduced his project for saving the
