destroy another illusion—which imagines that the countries in alliance with us can easily be brought into line with the ideas of Zimmerwald and Kintal (this was the Russian imperialists' favourite way of referring to the peace formula of the Soviet). Lord Cecil subjected the notorious formula 'without annexations or indemnities' to severe criticism, basing his contentions on the essential interests of Great Britain and her Allies."
The same speech produced such a deplorable impression in Russian Socialist and democratic circles that the leading democratic organs refrained from commenting on it at length. But their mood may be judged from the following comments in the Izvestia (7/20th May) on the above article in the Rech: "Miliukov's organ, the Rech, is triumphant with unconcealed and malicious delight—and what for? Because the English Foreign Minister adopted a none too benevolent attitude to the peace 'without annexations or indemnities,' to which revolutionary democratic Russia and with them the Provisional Government have pledged themselves. The late Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is delighted that Russia's policy meets with opposition in England!"
But however harmful these speeches were, the main evil did not come from them, but from the absolutely intolerable attitude of the Allies to Russia's request for a conference to revise the Allied war-aims. Had the Allies deliberately decided to drive Russia to desperation, had they consciously intended to destroy in the Russian army and the Russian people all confidence in the Allies, they could not have done so more successfully.
In effect, the Russian democracy, having definitely repudiated all aims of conquest in their foreign policy, very soon realised the need of revising the existing treaties and agreements between Russia and her Allies. The sinister significance of the Secret Treaties began to be known. There were two currents of opinion in the democracy. The radical minority was for an immediate
