worth to the Russian people but solely from the "military point of view." Here in England that seemed the most natural way of thinking; but in Russia it was felt to be a monstrous lapse. To look at the overthrow of the Autocracy and the liberation of the Russian people as no more than a means for the better prosecution of the war, was indeed cruel and stupid to the point of disaster. It was bound to frighten away Russia.
The Revolution was for the Russian people the greatest blessing that could ever happen. For them the war was but a means of liberation, and, whether all Russians were conscious of it or not, the great enthusiasm shown at the beginning for the war was only to be explained by the belief, hope or foreboding that the war would somehow or other lead to a new and better world. Without the hope that it would make Russia free the war had no meaning in Russia at all. English people will never understand the spirit of the Revolution and the extent of the disappointment felt in Russia when this "utilitarian" (as it was called there) point of view became known, so long as they decline to see that the Russian people were justified in looking upon the Revolution as the highest blessing in the world and in estimating all other things—the war included—by this new criterion: whether it helped or hindered the consolidation of the gains of the Revolution.
The Revolution had been the holiest and the highest hope of several generations of Russians. The best men and women had joyfully given their lives for its accomplishment. Russia at length became free; and Russia's Allies could think of nothing but of the effect that it might have upon their own military fortunes.
There was never a more bitter and unexpected disappointment than when Russia became conscious of this Allied "selfishness." It was a blunder; a heavy and bitter blunder on the part of the Allies. But what came later was a crime.
I refer to the sympathy, encouragement, and help given to every counter-revolutionist and adventurer who
