that enthusiasm for the war which had been so striking in the early autumn of 1914.
The Galician disaster laid bare the terrible lack of munitions in the Russian Army, which was regarded as the primary cause of the military collapse. This led to the widespread idea that to achieve victory all Russia needed was a great and well-supplied army. The people, therefore, decided to make munitions, and a great movement was started with the watchword, "All for the Army." There had been no precedent for this movement in the earlier months of the war. It commenced its activities with truly virgin enthusiasm. But its foundations and its practical aims were totally unsound, and only served to hasten the rapid exhaustion of the country. In the feverish enthusiasm to supply the troops with ammunition and materials, the need for husbanding the country's resources in machinery, plant, and permanent means of transport was overlooked. Undoubtedly, from the point of view of immediate military advantage, mobilisation of industry was a great and striking success. During the retreat of the Russian Army from the Carpathians the soldiers in many cases had to throw stones at the advancing enemy. At that time the Russian artillery could fire, on an average, only a few rounds with one gun out of a battery of five or six. Sometimes even the infantry had nothing to fight with but sticks. But in a few months after the mobilisation of industry the whole army was well—in some cases exceedingly well—supplied with munitions. But at what price? At the price of the complete and utter exhaustion of Russia. The mobilisation of industry is a most important page in the tragic history of the economic disintegration of Russia.
Certainly, from the point of view of immediate war efficiency, this period was the most brilliant in the conduct of the war. And it was marvellous how soon the popular enthusiasm and the joint efforts of the whole country could achieve such results. But in the actual circumstances of this
