CHAPTER SEVEN
THE DISORGANISATION OF
AGRICULTURE
LET us now see how the war affected the other great component of Russia's national economy—her agriculture. If the exhaustion of industry was not appreciatel till the very last hour, it is little wonder that the exhaustion of Russian agriculture is still looked upon as a paradox or a puzzle. Indeed at first sight it is puzzling. Russia is the largest agricultural country in Europe, and one of the largest in the world. She was the granary of Europe. By far the greater part of her exports consisted of products of the soil. Hence, when the war put an end to her foreign trade and Russia could no longer export the surplus of her grain, she ought rather to have suffered from plentifulness than from scarcity. It is therefore easy to understand that Europe was shocked when—first rumours—and then the sheer fact that Petrograd and Moscow had been put on rations, became known. That Russia was threatened by famine seemed too absurd, too incredible. Even in Russia itself the food question was not taken seriously for many months. When real starvation was imminent, nobody could explain where the misfortune came from. People ironically shrugged their shoulders and said: "Well, in Russia anything can happen!" And yet, there was nothing puzzling in the agricultural crisis of Russia. The only puzzling thing was the incredible stupidity and the absence of foresight of those who were conducting this war.
To begin with, Russian agriculture never was sound and healthy. Russia lived permanently in a state of agricultural crisis. Famine, or at least semi-starva-
