abroad; it also created a new source of consumption of grain—the army at the Front. The same men in civil life would eat much or little according- as the times were good or bad, according to what they had in stock. But a soldier has to be fed, fed continually, and fed well. The needs of the army demanded a continuous and regular supply of grain.
The peasants had to supply the army, and the army consumed hardly less, probably more, than Russia used to export in peace time. The requirements of the army would have absorbed all the surplus of grain remaining in the country even if the area under cultivation had remained the same. But owing to the diminution of tillage and yield, the regular consumption of the army considerably surpassed the actual surplus. Before the war Russia used to export one-third of her cereal products, and two-thirds were consumed in the country. In the very first year of the war the whole of the surplus which would normally have been exported was taken over by the Government for the army. But, as the war dragged on, and the army grew in numbers, and the production correspondingly decreased, so a greater and greater proportion was taken for the army. In 1917, according to the statement made by Shingariov[1] in May of that year, the civil population was getting a little more than a third of the yearly production.
The removal of millions of men and horses from production is in itself sufficient to account for the agricultural crisis of Russia. But to understand thoroughly how Russia as an agricultural country became so poor during the war, it is necessary to consider two more factors. First, the increase in the consumption of agricultural products in the country; and, secondly, the slackening of economic inducements towards the intensification of work. It is a deplorable fact that the peasantry, while they consumed more actually became less industrious as the war went on.
- ↑ Shingariov—the tragically murdered Minister of Agriculture in the first Provisional Government.
