Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/215

RECENT WORK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LEIBNIZ. 201 Again, the organic body, which Dr. Cassirer treats as part of the- monad, is said by Leibniz to be composed of subordinate monads (e.g. Gerh., vi., 598); and it is constantly affirmed that monads are dispersed throughout matter (e.g. Gerh., ii., 135, 295, 301 ; vi., 608; vii., 330). In fact, as soon as matter is regarded as merely phenomenal, and not a confused perception of actual monads, all the scientific grounds for Leibniz's views, which are so dear to our author, vanish into thin air. The only remaining ground for plurality of monads would be metaphysical perfection a principle of which the work before us takes very little account, since it is abstract and purely logical. In fact, the philosophy attributed by Dr. Cassirer to Leibniz is a fairy-tale quite as fantastic and arbi- trary as the Monadology used to seem to be, whereas the system set forth by M. Couturat consists of deductions, drawn in Leibniz's own words, and almost all of them valid, from logical principles- which in his day were universally admitted. After a discussion of the origin of Leibniz's philosophy, there is a critical appendix in which the author's views are defended against M. Couturat and myself. It is urged (p. 537) that Leibniz's theory of phenomena presupposes a system of fundamental relations not reducible to predications. The reply is, that it is just because of this irreducibility that the said phenomena are regarded by Leibniz as phenomena and not as noumena. The work is thorough and careful in its use of the sources, though there is, to my mind, a somewhat undue amount of inter- pretation and a somewhat excessive readiness to regard as figurative expressions which another theory could accept literally. The criticisms which have been made in the above review are almost all of them criticisms of the Kantian philosophy itself, and those who accept that philosophy will find in Dr. Cassirer's book exactly what they desire.