Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 12.djvu/352

338 MARY WHITON CALKINS : involve its opposite and thus to imply a reality deeper than that of itself or of its other. Becoming, which is merely, thus, a name for the dialectic process, might as well be called the synthesis of Somewhat and Other, of Finite and Infinite, or of Essence and Appearance, as of Being and Naught. The true synthesis of Being and Naught, on the other hand, is Determined Being ; for since Pure Being and Pure Nothing are shown to be mere fictions the reality implied by each is that of Determined Being. Hegel admits this by the statement " Being Determinate is the Union of Being and Nothing". 1 He virtually admits, also, that Becoming is a universal category, by giving the name to the transition from Somewhat to Other. 2 Indeed, every page of the Logic shows the futility of trying to confine Becoming to any one stage least of all to an early stage of the thought development. The entire neglect, in this reading of Hegel, of the sections on Quantity and Measure is a more serious matter. The attempt to explain it in detail would involve a complicated discussion, but the reasons for the omission are in general the following : the categories of Quantity are substantially parallel with those of the later sections of book i. the cate- gories of Finitude and Infinity, of One and Being-for-Self. For example : (1) The attributes of Quantity, Continuity and Discreteness are explicitly identified with the Attraction and Repulsion (meaning likeness and difference) within the One. 3 (2) The discussion of Infinite Quantitative Progression differs in no essential respect from the treatment of the subject in the consideration of the Quality-categories, Finitude and Infinity. Finally (3) the discussion of Quantitative Eatio 4 is a close anticipation of the teaching, in book iii., about the inter-relation of syllogisms; and the sections in book iii., as we have seen, are really a continuation of the concluding sections under Quality. This virtual parallel of the categories of Quantity with those of Quality does away with the alleged necessity of ' reconciling ' Quality with Quantity in Measure. The section on Measure, therefore, in all its confusion of empirical illus- tration with metaphysical analysis simply falls away, to the great advantage of Hegel's argument. The discussion, in book ii. of the Logic, of Eeality as Unknowable Essence has been transposed in the present 1 Encycl., 89. * Werke, iii., 115 2 . 3 Werke, iii., 204 ; Encycl., 100. 4 Werke, iii., 367 2 ; Encycl., 105 1 .