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468 c. M. WALSH : KANT'S TEANSCENDENTAL which nobody has ever done. But he himself the while, in claiming that we have direct consciousness of empirically outside things in the sense merely of extended things (repre- sentations in us individually), is really also claiming that we have direct consciousness of extended things outside us universally, things only corresponding to the extended repre- sentations in us individually. But such things really are transcendentally outside us, although they are supposed to resemble our representations and are not taken to be things- in-themselves out of space altogether ; for he is maintaining that they are in a space and in a consciousness without, however, making it plain in what space or in whose con- sciousness they are. Then when he came to republish the Kritik he seems to have had an inkling of the unsatisfactori- ness of this reply, for he omitted it and substituted elsewhere an argument the so-called Eefutation of Idealism. Thus he now attempts to give a proof of what he before thought to need no proof. His argument is that my consciousness in general of things inside me (including extended represen- tations), or of myself, is an indication of the existence of extended things outside me, on the ground that my con- sciousness of the former, because of its positing something permanent in sense perception 1 which cannot be in me (although he finds it in space and puts space in me), would not be possible without the existence of the latter. And he now omits to notice even so much as the distinction he had noticed in the first edition, and speaks quite indefinitely of the " objects in space outside me ". He does not see, or does not want it to be seen, that .either, if he is trying to prove the need of the existence merely of extended objects, the argument is useless, since of these we do have direct consciousness ; or, if he is trying to prove the existence of objects in a space outside me distinct from the space in me, objects of which I do not have direct consciousness, he might just as well have made this a proof of the existence of objects outside me indefinitely, that is, of objects admitted to be transcendental, since also here nothing is introduced into the argument to show that the outer objects must be in space. Where Kant attempted to prove this was in the First Analogy; and there what he aimed at proving was that there must be a " substance in phenomenon," a sub- stratum of all change which itself remains unchanged, which substance indeed he took to be extended in space, the only argument for this being the general epistemo- 1 This rests on the Proof of the First Analogy.