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THE ABSOLUTE AS UNKNOWABLE. 39 my sensation. Suppose, then, we are supplied with the notion of a reality which exists in a non-discursive form, and some knowledge of which in detail we have already acquired. We know that this detail is not exhausted, but this does not destroy the value, of the knowledge we have; the object we know is red, and it is none the less red because it is round, and smooth, and has countless other character- istics which are still undiscovered. Apart, then, from any further judgment we may pass about this, we are able to know, or mean it mean it as something which exists in its own truth, distinct from the perceptual experience by which we see it, or the possible judgments we might pass about it if we began to analyse. If, now, we go on to learn some- thing new about the object, this, in our process of discovery, appears as a new relation which has to be added to the reality already there; actually we recognise that this process takes place only in our experience, and that the whole fact was already in existence in its non-discursive form before the judgment was made. If, however, this extraneousness of the object judged about to the elements of our experience is not heeded, we can never reach anything in knowledge which is not infected with the relational form. This is what I understand Mr. Bradley to maintain. There is a reality, and this reality shows itself in our experience in feeling, sensation, perception. Sensation does not, that is, come as a duplicate of the reality known, but it is an actual element of the reality itself, and as such enters into the judgment. Judgment says that this reality, of which a section reveals itself in feeling, is extended beyond the mere feeling by the reference of an idea. Accordingly, the subject "this apple " in the judgment " this apple is red " does not represent a fairly adequate outline which is to be filled in by subse- quent judgments, and which, by reason of its distinction from our knowledge of it, can be recognised as containing, in reality, a great deal of which we do not know; it is rather a component part of reality, which exists as the " burning focus " of our present sensational experience, and whose boundaries are to be gradually extended till it becomes we know not what in an ever-growing synthesis. The real subject is, therefore, the whole of reality, since the idea cannot be predicated of the nominal subject, which, by reason of its complete identity with our present experience and knowledge, is itself merely, and not itself completed by the idea. 1 In 1 From the other standpoint the nominal subject is not identical with my experience, but distinct from it, and consciously recognised as going